WEBVTT

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New and frightening
warning from the FBI

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on hackers using
malicious software

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to launch a cyber attack
against US businesses.

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In some ways, it's a whole
new way of making warfare,

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and I don't think that
that overstates it one bit.

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There is a cyber war going on.

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The United States
started that cyber war.

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The first cyber weapon

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to threaten to damage targets
in the real world.

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Hackers in places like China,
North Korea, Iran, elsewhere,

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are exhibiting the capability
to hit the power grid.

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Chinese state-backed hackers

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have been mobilized

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anything to do with
covid-19 related research.

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Many of the threats in the
21st century will be in cyber:

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Misinformation, disinformation.

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YouTube, Facebook, Twitter.

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WhatsApp? Instagram?

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We are human species.
We can be hacked.

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Russian government hackers

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have breached the network
of the DNC.

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I don't think anybody knows
it was Russia.

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Russia, China,
and other countries

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are collecting stolen
information from hackers.

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Today we face threats

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that have increased
in sophistication,

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magnitude, intensity,
volume, and velocity.

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What about the confidence
in the vote?

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Especially against the backdrop

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of the Russian interference
in 2016.

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They're involved
going after me on Facebook.

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Because Putin knows me,

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and I know him, and he
doesn't want me to be president.

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President Trump claimed
without evidence,

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quote, "rigged 2020 election
will be the scandal of our times."

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Are you suggesting that you might
not accept the results of the election?

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I have to see.

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Madam Speaker,

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the President of
the United States.

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..:: Presented By ZarFilm Website ::..
‏.::  www.bolboljan.net ::.

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At the end of the
Bush administration,

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president Bush decided
he had to stop

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the Iranian nuclear program.

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The United Nations has imposed
sanctions on Iran,

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and made it clear that the world
will not allow the regime in Tehran

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to acquire nuclear weapons.

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But he had a problem.

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My second purpose today
is to share with you

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what the United States knows about
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction...

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We had just gone to
a war in Iraq

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on the false pretense
that Iraq had a nuclear weapon.

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So there was no way
he was going to be able to

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publicly convince the world

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to get into a conflict with
Iran over its nuclear program.

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One day, a group of
intelligence officials

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and military officers

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came to the president and said,
"sir, we have another way."

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They told Bush that a joint
Israeli-American cyber team

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had designed some code

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that could get into the Iranian
nuclear control system.

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Until then, countries were
using cyber to steal data.

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To spy on each other.

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But almost no one had used
cyber as an offensive weapon.

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The plan was

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a piece of malware
would be delivered

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into the industrial
control systems

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running the Iranian
nuclear program.

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this network was air gapped.

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In other words, it's not
connected to the Internet.

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So you had to have ways in which the
code could jump onto those computers.

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There's still some mystery
about exactly how this code

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made it from the NSA
and the Israeli cyber unit

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into the natanz plant.

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There are many ways,

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including slipping in a USB key.

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But we also now know

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that the NSA had designed
a brilliant small system,

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about the size of a briefcase,

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that could work from six
or seven miles away,

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beaming computer code
into a computer

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that had been set up
with a receiver chip.

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And that device could be used

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not only to put code in,

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but later to replace it
and update it.

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Once they got in,

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the code started
unlocking itself,

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and it started two major tasks.

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The first one was to record

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everything that the operator
would be saying,

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and essentially,
put that on a loop.

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So that every day, when
the operator came in to work,

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everything would look just fine.

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It's sort of like
a classic heist movie

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where the surveillance video
is run on a loop,

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and the guard never knows
what's actually going on.

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While at the same time, somebody's
breaking in and stealing something.

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The Iranians were thinking
the whole time

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that they're making progress.

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That they're moving
towards their goal,

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when in fact,
these systems are deadlined.

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Because the second task
for the code

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was to take the centrifuges
and break them.

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This code was so ingenious

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that not only did it have
this sort of fake video,

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pay no attention
to what's going on here,

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it would lie in wait.

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And so days would go by,

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where the centrifuges were spinning
exactly as they were supposed to.

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And then all of a sudden,
they'd speed up really fast.

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And then when
you'd turn to look,

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they would slow down
to the regular speed.

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And eventually what
happens when you do this

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to these finely tuned machines,

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is that they break
themselves apart.

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When President Obama
had that traditional meeting

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with his predecessor,
George Bush,

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Bush told him that
there were two programs

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he had to make sure
that he preserved.

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One of them was
the drone program.

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The second program
was "olympic games,"

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the code name for the program
against Iran.

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suddenly, in his
first months in office,

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President Obama finds himself
in the situation room,

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picking out centrifuges
to attack.

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For a while, the Iranians
had no idea what was going on.

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They didn't know if they had
made engineering errors,

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whether they had bad parts.

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They suspected sabotage,
but couldn't prove it.

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Until one day,
when the code got out.

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This code is only supposed
to go into one facility,

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and it was never supposed to be
known to the rest of the world.

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Instead, it escapes the box.

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It gets out of that facility and
begins to spread around the world.

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These are the letters
and numbers

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behind the so-called
stuxnet virus.

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It begins with
a simple USB key.

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Then with surgical precision,

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penetrates some of the world's
most advanced computer security.

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Its creators hid
their tracks so well,

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experts say we will likely
never know who created it.

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As we began to hear about

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this incredibly sophisticated
piece of code

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that the industry
was calling stuxnet,

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I began to reconstruct the story

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of who authorized
this code to be written.

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Neither Israel nor the US

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had publicly admitted that
this was designed by them.

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You did that without at all
mentioning Stuxnet or Olympic Games.

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That was, that was impressive.

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I never heard of those.

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Can you talk about Stuxnet?

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-It's years ago.
That-- One thing that--

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I don't want to
talk about it, okay?

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It's just that, it's a mystery.

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I don't want to talk about it.

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Let me know if I'm not--
If I'm being too subtle, okay?

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This is the first worm designed
to damage the physical world.

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It's a new dimension
in sabotage and warfare.

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The implications and
the possible consequences

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are only now coming to light.

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The stuxnet attack on Iran

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was the first time a major state

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used a powerful cyber weapon

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in a very aggressive way.

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People knew that
the US government

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had been developing tools

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that can manipulate
computer systems

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to create effects
in the real world.

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Stuxnet was the first big
example of that happening.

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Here's what it looks like,
here's how sophisticated it is,

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and here's what it can do.

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You take that same principle,

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you could shut down
an airport with a similar tool.

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You could shut down an
electrical grid with a similar tool.

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You could shut down a gas
pipeline with a similar tool.

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So these things
that were speculative

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suddenly become real.

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The question is,
if you're the first mover there,

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have you now said, "That's
fair game for everybody."

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They've crossed the Rubicon.

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The United States had
basically legitimized

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the use of cyber

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as a weapon against
another country

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against whom you
had not declared war.

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It pushed the world into
an entirely new territory.

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Once the Iranians
took the punch,

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Iran said, "Oh, that's the way
the game is played.

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All right, I get this now."

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And then they started to unleash

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against the United States.

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In 2013, it's clear that Iran
is still working towards

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a nuclear weapon.

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And the Obama administration
in the US

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is trying to start negotiations

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to sort of coax them
away from that.

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In October of 2013,
there's a panel.

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There are several people on it,

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but the really
interesting person

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that comes to talk
on the panel is Sheldon Adelson.

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Sheldon adelson is one of
the richest men in the world.

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He's a casino magnate.

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He's got casinos off China,

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he's got a major casino
in Singapore.

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He's got two major casinos
in Las Vegas,

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and that's really
where he made his money.

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The billionaire businessman

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who made a fortune with casinos

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gave more than $92 million

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to conservative candidates
in the 2012 race.

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One of his most
famous things is

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an effort to spend
a hundred million dollars

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to make sure that Obama doesn't
get elected to a second term.

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You've got to really
dislike me...

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...to spend that kind of money.

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And he's very clear, and,

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and full-throated
about his opinions.

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How are you able to be
so outspoken?

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I flunked diplomacy 101.

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Especially when it
comes to Iran,

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and when it comes to these
negotiations in particular.

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Wait, so you would support

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negotiations with Iran
currently,

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so long as they first seized
all enrichment of uranium?

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No. What do you mean
support nego--

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What are we going to
negotiate about?

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What I would say is... Listen.

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You see that desert out there?

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I want to show you something.

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You pick up your cell phone,

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and you call somewhere
in Nebraska,

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and you say, "Okay, let it go."

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So there's an atomic weapon
goes over ballistic missiles

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in the middle of the desert
that doesn't hurt a soul.

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Maybe a couple of rattlesnakes
and scorpions or whatever.

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And then, and then you say,
"See?

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The next one is in
the middle of Tehran."

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So, we mean business.

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And that was not
taken well in Iran.

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See? The next one is in
the middle of Tehran.

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Somebody gets a
YouTube clip of this.

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It goes up.

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Doesn't take long before
Iran notices it.

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It's clear that Iran
wants to punish adelson.

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And they want to make it hurt.

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Casinos are basically
big banks, right?

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The amount of money that goes
in and out of a casino in a day

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is millions and millions
of dollars.

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And so, casinos spend an enormous
amount of money on physical security.

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On cameras, on security guards,
on vaults.

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Like, the things that
you would do to protect

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chips and cash.

00:13:15.395 --> 00:13:17.603
But as far as their
it infrastructure,

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what does that look like?

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So, around December 2013,

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hackers in Iran start
looking for a weak link

00:13:30.186 --> 00:13:32.436
into sands corp's network.

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And the hackers just
ultimately get lucky.

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A senior software engineer
had come from Las Vegas,

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was working at a small casino
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,

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that's part of
the sands corp empire,

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and had used his credentials

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to get onto one of the machines
in Bethlehem,

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and the hackers found him.

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Those credentials allowed them
to get into the Bethlehem network.

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And then, from Bethlehem,

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to Las Vegas, which is really
where they wanted to be.

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They'd start kind of slowly,

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but by early February,

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they release a few hundred
lines of code,

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which is designed to,
not to steal information,

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but to destroy computers.

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To, to override information.
To really create chaos

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within Sands Corp's network.

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I received a phone call

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from a support desk manager

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at about 4:00 A.M.

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The support desk manager
had been receiving calls

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telling her that people's emails
were getting locked up.

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Some of the engineers
tried to look into

00:14:44.436 --> 00:14:46.144
what might be the cause of it,

00:14:46.228 --> 00:14:48.603
and they couldn't get in.

00:14:49.603 --> 00:14:51.770
I wouldn't say that
they were panicked.

00:14:51.853 --> 00:14:53.436
I would say that there was, um,

00:14:53.520 --> 00:14:57.269
an extreme sense of urgency.

00:14:57.353 --> 00:15:00.687
In the morning,
sometimes I check my email.

00:15:00.770 --> 00:15:02.812
And I couldn't get to anything.

00:15:02.895 --> 00:15:07.353
First thing I thought is, someone's
gonna call me and yell at me,

00:15:07.436 --> 00:15:10.228
because probably
the software is down.

00:15:10.311 --> 00:15:12.228
Minutes of a software outage

00:15:12.311 --> 00:15:15.812
can amount to a loss of
a serious amount of money.

00:15:17.895 --> 00:15:19.645
We were getting reports
left and right

00:15:19.728 --> 00:15:22.520
of people not being able
to access their computers.

00:15:22.603 --> 00:15:26.853
Our internal systems, our email,
our way to communicate.

00:15:26.937 --> 00:15:28.478
Accounting, was,
like, paralyzed,

00:15:28.561 --> 00:15:30.186
and that place is
all accountants.

00:15:30.269 --> 00:15:32.978
I mean, everybody in the back
that isn't IT

00:15:33.061 --> 00:15:34.895
is in some kind of finance team.

00:15:34.978 --> 00:15:38.061
As the guys kept digging
into it more and more,

00:15:38.144 --> 00:15:41.937
a sense of, like,
"Holy shit, this is huge.

00:15:42.019 --> 00:15:44.478
Like, the damage is massive."

00:15:48.144 --> 00:15:50.853
At some point in time,
we made a decision

00:15:50.937 --> 00:15:54.228
that everybody needs to
turn off their computers.

00:15:54.311 --> 00:15:58.937
We basically had teams go out
and unplug desktop machines.

00:15:59.019 --> 00:16:01.436
We were going to pcs
on the casino floor

00:16:01.520 --> 00:16:03.853
in the pits,
and at the player's club,

00:16:03.937 --> 00:16:05.228
and in the cage,

00:16:05.311 --> 00:16:07.436
and taking them offline
one at a time.

00:16:07.520 --> 00:16:09.353
Scanning 'em, cleaning 'em.

00:16:11.770 --> 00:16:15.853
We knew at that time
this was a possible hack.

00:16:15.937 --> 00:16:18.937
But I still thought
it was a singular event.

00:16:19.019 --> 00:16:22.311
That we were basically
doing damage control.

00:16:22.395 --> 00:16:24.645
But there were things
that popped up

00:16:24.728 --> 00:16:26.978
that indicated that it wasn't
somebody hacking

00:16:27.061 --> 00:16:28.728
just for the sake of hacking.

00:16:28.812 --> 00:16:30.603
It was a political statement.

00:16:32.520 --> 00:16:35.561
The Las Vegas sands website
had been defaced,

00:16:35.645 --> 00:16:37.978
to show an image of the globe

00:16:38.061 --> 00:16:41.395
with various locations
of the world on fire.

00:16:42.436 --> 00:16:44.478
I remember flames,

00:16:44.561 --> 00:16:49.019
and something about adelson
and cutting off his tongue.

00:16:49.103 --> 00:16:51.561
We were all curious
as to who did it,

00:16:51.645 --> 00:16:54.186
and then when we saw what
had happened to the website,

00:16:54.269 --> 00:16:55.687
it was like, "oh.

00:16:55.770 --> 00:16:59.395
Well, this is a reaction
to what Mr. Adelson had said."

00:16:59.478 --> 00:17:02.478
You know, my stomach sank.
It was like,

00:17:02.561 --> 00:17:05.603
excuse my language,
like, "Holy shit."

00:17:06.687 --> 00:17:08.228
this is real.

00:17:11.061 --> 00:17:14.186
A cascading attack.
Servers shut down.

00:17:14.269 --> 00:17:17.436
Screens go blank.
A rush to unplug computers.

00:17:17.520 --> 00:17:20.561
This attack hit the world's
largest casino operation

00:17:20.645 --> 00:17:21.853
ten months ago.

00:17:21.937 --> 00:17:23.978
Sands Corp was able to
keep it secret for months,

00:17:24.061 --> 00:17:27.478
and to keep the scale, especially,
of the attacks, secret for months.

00:17:27.561 --> 00:17:30.561
CNN has learned on
February 10th of this year,

00:17:30.645 --> 00:17:33.812
thousands of employees
at sands casinos in Las Vegas

00:17:33.895 --> 00:17:36.895
and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
had their computers hit.

00:17:38.186 --> 00:17:41.186
They didn't want to
get this out.

00:17:41.269 --> 00:17:43.895
They wanted controlled
communications,

00:17:43.978 --> 00:17:45.770
is what I will say.

00:17:48.770 --> 00:17:51.853
That comment that adelson
made on that stage

00:17:51.937 --> 00:17:53.687
was a very expensive
comment to make.

00:17:55.103 --> 00:17:58.353
the cost of the attack
and recovering from the attack

00:17:58.436 --> 00:18:00.395
was about $40 million.

00:18:00.478 --> 00:18:02.728
It cost the Iranians
far less than $40 million.

00:18:02.812 --> 00:18:05.186
I mean, that's the thing about
the asymmetry of these attacks

00:18:05.269 --> 00:18:08.687
is hackers working in a team
for a few days,

00:18:08.770 --> 00:18:11.311
You know, they started
probing in December.

00:18:11.395 --> 00:18:15.186
You know, a couple of teams got
really active for a few days in January,

00:18:15.269 --> 00:18:17.853
and in February,
they unleashed the attack.

00:18:17.937 --> 00:18:21.353
You know, that's a very low-cost attack
from a nation-state point of view.

00:18:26.520 --> 00:18:29.353
The sands casino attack
was a warning shot.

00:18:29.436 --> 00:18:32.269
It was a reinforcement
of the thought

00:18:32.353 --> 00:18:34.812
that a middling power like Iran

00:18:34.895 --> 00:18:38.770
could shut down a big
economic enterprise

00:18:38.853 --> 00:18:40.687
in the United States.

00:18:40.770 --> 00:18:44.186
And that if the sands casino
could be brought down,

00:18:44.269 --> 00:18:46.144
so could the rest of Vegas.

00:18:46.228 --> 00:18:50.144
And what happened in Vegas
wouldn't stay in Vegas.

00:18:58.687 --> 00:19:01.895
The evolution of cyber
has happened very quickly,

00:19:01.978 --> 00:19:04.311
in terms of its importance
to the United States,

00:19:04.395 --> 00:19:08.395
and the organizational dimension
of it in the US government.

00:19:09.520 --> 00:19:12.186
In 2007, the director of
national intelligence

00:19:12.269 --> 00:19:15.228
issues a threat assessment of
all the threats against the country.

00:19:15.311 --> 00:19:18.853
The word "cyber" isn't in it
a single time.

00:19:20.853 --> 00:19:22.937
Fast forward just
a couple of years,

00:19:23.019 --> 00:19:25.019
you had the creation
of cyber command.

00:19:26.186 --> 00:19:29.436
Fast forward a couple
more years, it's 2012.

00:19:29.520 --> 00:19:32.645
Suddenly cyber has gone from
not being mentioned at all

00:19:32.728 --> 00:19:33.978
in those threat assessments,

00:19:34.061 --> 00:19:35.978
to being one of
the top three threats

00:19:36.061 --> 00:19:38.061
facing the United States.

00:19:42.895 --> 00:19:44.645
Secretary of defense panetta

00:19:44.728 --> 00:19:48.228
goes on board the intrepid, which
is an aircraft carrier museum--

00:19:48.311 --> 00:19:50.520
I think the background
is not a coincidence--

00:19:50.603 --> 00:19:53.144
and talks about
a cyber Pearl harbor.

00:19:53.228 --> 00:19:56.937
We know that foreign
cyber actors

00:19:57.019 --> 00:20:01.895
Are probing america's
critical infrastructure networks.

00:20:01.978 --> 00:20:05.561
They are targeting the
computer control systems

00:20:05.645 --> 00:20:10.228
that operate chemical,
electricity, and water plants,

00:20:10.311 --> 00:20:13.311
and those that
guide transportation

00:20:13.395 --> 00:20:16.228
throughout this country.

00:20:16.311 --> 00:20:20.478
The collective result
of these kinds of attacks

00:20:20.561 --> 00:20:23.353
could be a cyber Pearl harbor.

00:20:23.436 --> 00:20:26.311
And as people were warned about
this notion of the cyber Pearl harbor,

00:20:26.395 --> 00:20:28.353
what they seem to miss was,
in fact,

00:20:28.436 --> 00:20:31.061
that the US had set up
a regime where,

00:20:31.144 --> 00:20:34.061
if they, if Russia took down
the electrical grid

00:20:34.144 --> 00:20:36.061
or if China took down
a, a gas pipeline,

00:20:36.144 --> 00:20:38.978
they should expect
a military response.

00:20:39.061 --> 00:20:42.228
The government had plans
for a massive, kind of,

00:20:42.311 --> 00:20:44.061
major attack against
the electrical grid.

00:20:44.144 --> 00:20:46.770
What they didn't really
have plans for was

00:20:46.853 --> 00:20:49.978
this kind of, like,
incremental, hit a company,

00:20:50.061 --> 00:20:51.895
you know, destroy its brand.

00:20:51.978 --> 00:20:54.186
Destroy its capacity
to do business.

00:20:54.269 --> 00:20:56.395
How are we gonna respond,
as the US government,

00:20:56.478 --> 00:20:58.645
to those kinds of attacks?

00:21:23.687 --> 00:21:26.937
I started with just
a huge fascination

00:21:27.019 --> 00:21:28.812
with North Korea.

00:21:33.520 --> 00:21:37.186
Me and my writing partner Evan
would read articles and books

00:21:37.269 --> 00:21:39.019
and watch documentaries,
and it was just, like,

00:21:39.103 --> 00:21:41.103
endlessly fascinating to us.

00:21:41.186 --> 00:21:42.395
Uh, who is it?

00:21:42.478 --> 00:21:44.311
It is, uh, Kim Jong-un.

00:21:44.395 --> 00:21:45.770
What?

00:21:45.853 --> 00:21:48.436
And then when
Kim Jong-un took over

00:21:48.520 --> 00:21:51.311
is when the idea really
expanded in our heads,

00:21:51.395 --> 00:21:54.478
because we realized
he was around our age,

00:21:54.561 --> 00:21:56.645
um, and we read more
about his life,

00:21:56.728 --> 00:21:59.812
and he weirdly was like
a very sympathetic character

00:21:59.895 --> 00:22:01.561
in, in some ways.

00:22:05.186 --> 00:22:09.520
We came up with this story
about a guy who hosts

00:22:09.603 --> 00:22:13.269
a very exploitative
late night talk show.

00:22:15.144 --> 00:22:19.228
Kim Jong-un is a big fan
of his TV show.

00:22:22.561 --> 00:22:24.478
So we get an interview with him.

00:22:24.561 --> 00:22:26.311
And then the CIA says,

00:22:26.395 --> 00:22:28.228
because we are gonna be
the first Americans,

00:22:28.311 --> 00:22:30.186
you know, face-to-face with him
in a long time,

00:22:30.269 --> 00:22:31.895
uh, we could kill him.

00:22:35.853 --> 00:22:38.186
We pitched the idea to Sony,

00:22:38.269 --> 00:22:40.395
and they basically said, like,

00:22:40.478 --> 00:22:42.061
"If you get James Franco
in this,

00:22:42.144 --> 00:22:44.019
we'll make this movie
right away."

00:22:44.103 --> 00:22:45.853
And we were like, "Okay."

00:22:51.144 --> 00:22:52.770
If I recall correctly,

00:22:52.853 --> 00:22:56.853
it was them who suggested
that we make it actually

00:22:56.937 --> 00:22:58.228
Kim Jong-un.

00:23:01.103 --> 00:23:03.353
It was something that, like,
we were maybe, we were like,

00:23:03.436 --> 00:23:04.645
"Should we make up a guy?

00:23:04.728 --> 00:23:07.311
Is that too much?" Um, and,

00:23:07.395 --> 00:23:09.645
Sony suggested, like, "Well,
just call him Kim Jong-un.

00:23:09.728 --> 00:23:12.019
It's probably funnier that way."
Okay.

00:23:16.103 --> 00:23:18.186
So, when the trailer comes out,

00:23:18.269 --> 00:23:21.103
North Korea releases
a statement through the UN

00:23:21.186 --> 00:23:22.645
condemning the movie.

00:23:22.728 --> 00:23:24.978
North Korea is accusing
the United States

00:23:25.061 --> 00:23:28.061
of "provocative insanity."
An "act of war."

00:23:28.144 --> 00:23:31.353
And promising "a decisive
and merciless countermeasure"

00:23:31.436 --> 00:23:34.311
if the US supports
the release of the film.

00:23:38.269 --> 00:23:41.395
We were trying to understand
how seriously to take this

00:23:41.478 --> 00:23:44.478
and whether there was something
that we should be concerned about.

00:23:44.561 --> 00:23:46.687
I called a friend of mine
at the State Department

00:23:46.770 --> 00:23:50.478
who directed me to the person
who knew about the subject.

00:23:52.478 --> 00:23:55.144
They said the
North Korean government

00:23:55.228 --> 00:23:57.895
tends to be prone to
make a lot of threats.

00:23:58.019 --> 00:24:01.395
But almost never carried out
on those threats.

00:24:01.478 --> 00:24:03.311
And they would certainly never

00:24:03.395 --> 00:24:06.603
be able to carry out
on a threat on US soil.

00:24:06.687 --> 00:24:09.520
There was no mention
whatsoever of cyber.

00:24:11.186 --> 00:24:14.603
Around then, conversations
started to come up,

00:24:14.687 --> 00:24:17.853
of like, "should we
tone it down a bit?"

00:24:19.186 --> 00:24:21.478
The idea that maybe, uh,

00:24:21.561 --> 00:24:26.019
killing Kim Jong-un
so graphically was maybe, um,

00:24:26.103 --> 00:24:27.603
extra antagonistic.

00:24:36.853 --> 00:24:41.061
Seth Rogen and his group
were very resistant.

00:24:41.144 --> 00:24:44.937
They felt that it added
to the satire.

00:24:45.019 --> 00:24:49.269
It was a lot of back and forth and there
was a little bit of argument about it.

00:24:49.353 --> 00:24:52.728
But we ultimately
came to a compromise, I think.

00:24:54.311 --> 00:24:58.061
At that point, we felt that we had
taken all the necessary precautions.

00:24:58.144 --> 00:25:00.645
We made the changes
to the picture that,

00:25:00.728 --> 00:25:04.061
you know, Sony felt, or that my,
my employer felt was,

00:25:04.144 --> 00:25:06.144
was necessary and, you know,

00:25:06.228 --> 00:25:08.228
the rest was about
getting the movie out.

00:25:12.061 --> 00:25:13.687
In North Korea,

00:25:13.770 --> 00:25:15.812
the reconnaissance
general bureau,

00:25:15.895 --> 00:25:19.019
which is the North Korean
equivalent of the CIA,

00:25:19.103 --> 00:25:21.645
dispatched a young hacker

00:25:21.728 --> 00:25:24.853
to go to China
and Southeast Asia

00:25:24.937 --> 00:25:29.561
and put together a team that
would break into Sony's systems.

00:25:30.853 --> 00:25:32.687
Jim clapper went to North Korea

00:25:32.770 --> 00:25:34.603
during the middle
of the Sony hack,

00:25:34.687 --> 00:25:37.353
and met the head of the
reconnaissance general bureau.

00:25:37.436 --> 00:25:40.019
He was trying to get the
release of two Americans there

00:25:40.103 --> 00:25:41.978
while the hack was underway.

00:25:42.061 --> 00:25:45.728
And he never raised it because
he never knew it was happening.

00:25:45.812 --> 00:25:49.103
The North Koreans
went about this patiently,

00:25:49.186 --> 00:25:50.770
and somewhat brilliantly.

00:25:52.603 --> 00:25:57.228
In September of 2014, they
broke into the Sony systems.

00:26:00.186 --> 00:26:02.978
But they didn't then just
turn around and attack.

00:26:03.061 --> 00:26:05.728
They spent weeks examining

00:26:05.812 --> 00:26:09.812
how each element
of Sony's operations

00:26:09.895 --> 00:26:11.770
were tied into
the computer system.

00:26:11.853 --> 00:26:14.269
They lurked in the system
long enough

00:26:14.353 --> 00:26:17.645
to figure out how they
could do maximum damage.

00:26:17.728 --> 00:26:21.395
And it wasn't until
just around Thanksgiving,

00:26:21.478 --> 00:26:24.353
two months later,
that they struck.

00:26:27.978 --> 00:26:30.853
I was driving to work.
My phone rang in the car.

00:26:30.937 --> 00:26:34.311
The chief financial officer
of the company rang me up

00:26:34.395 --> 00:26:36.520
and he said, "we have
a real problem at work.

00:26:36.603 --> 00:26:39.269
All the email has gone down."

00:26:39.353 --> 00:26:41.812
Nobody was able
to retrieve any data.

00:26:41.895 --> 00:26:44.311
And as the day progressed,
it became quickly evident

00:26:44.395 --> 00:26:47.436
that it was way beyond that.
That in fact, we had...

00:26:47.520 --> 00:26:51.061
Pretty much 70 percent of our computers
had been knocked out of action.

00:26:51.144 --> 00:26:52.687
Had been ruined, frankly.

00:26:52.770 --> 00:26:55.687
Serious breach at
Sony pictures last week.

00:26:55.770 --> 00:26:58.603
A skeleton appeared
on the Sony picture computers

00:26:58.687 --> 00:27:01.353
with a small message that claimed
they'd been hacked by a group

00:27:01.436 --> 00:27:03.103
calling itself
"guardians of peace."

00:27:03.186 --> 00:27:04.937
Whoever they are,
the guardians of peace

00:27:05.019 --> 00:27:06.770
have already done real damage.

00:27:06.853 --> 00:27:09.687
Employees communicated
with a phone tree,

00:27:09.770 --> 00:27:14.103
and paid people with paper checks
cut by a machine pulled from storage.

00:27:14.186 --> 00:27:15.687
Sony, by the time this is done,

00:27:15.770 --> 00:27:17.687
is gonna lose
tens of millions of dollars

00:27:17.770 --> 00:27:19.728
just recovering from
this attack.

00:27:19.812 --> 00:27:23.311
It's a huge cost, just in terms of
the impact of the IT infrastructure.

00:27:23.395 --> 00:27:26.395
But more importantly,
it's a huge cost to the brand,

00:27:26.478 --> 00:27:28.436
because they steal
a lot of data in this attack,

00:27:28.520 --> 00:27:30.186
and then they start
releasing it publicly.

00:27:30.269 --> 00:27:31.937
Tinseltown's dirty laundry

00:27:32.019 --> 00:27:33.895
is laid out in plain view.

00:27:33.978 --> 00:27:35.353
And it is not pretty.

00:27:35.436 --> 00:27:36.728
The studio's co-chairman

00:27:36.812 --> 00:27:38.228
and a powerful
Hollywood producer

00:27:38.311 --> 00:27:40.687
used racial jokes to mock
President Obama.

00:27:40.770 --> 00:27:42.645
A top producer criticizing

00:27:42.728 --> 00:27:45.311
Angelina Jolie's talent and ego.

00:27:45.395 --> 00:27:46.978
These are juicy.

00:27:47.061 --> 00:27:50.061
We had seen criminal hackers
and hacktivists

00:27:50.144 --> 00:27:52.144
use this hack and dump technique

00:27:52.228 --> 00:27:55.311
to intimidate victims
on a small scale.

00:27:55.395 --> 00:27:57.478
That was the first time
we had seen a nation-state

00:27:57.561 --> 00:27:59.019
do it very effectively.

00:27:59.103 --> 00:28:00.645
The first thing that
the North Koreans did

00:28:00.728 --> 00:28:02.228
was give it to reporters.

00:28:02.311 --> 00:28:04.937
And then, when they've
exhausted that channel,

00:28:05.019 --> 00:28:06.728
they gave it to WikiLeaks.

00:28:09.687 --> 00:28:12.520
This was all very valuable
information to the company.

00:28:12.603 --> 00:28:15.812
Trade secrets, like scripts
before movies were released,

00:28:15.895 --> 00:28:19.228
detailed contract information
about what had been paid to whom.

00:28:19.311 --> 00:28:22.019
By the way, Seth Rogen made
two million dollars more

00:28:22.103 --> 00:28:25.353
-than co-star James Franco.
-Mm...

00:28:25.436 --> 00:28:27.687
You wouldn't assume
someone's stolen property

00:28:27.770 --> 00:28:30.311
was instantly going to be made

00:28:30.395 --> 00:28:32.520
available for public consumption

00:28:32.603 --> 00:28:34.269
by the media.

00:28:34.353 --> 00:28:37.019
Sony were the victims
of a crime.

00:28:37.103 --> 00:28:39.395
And then the media
took the victims of a crime

00:28:39.478 --> 00:28:41.144
and made it a hundred
million times worse.

00:28:41.228 --> 00:28:44.728
You want us to assassinate
the leader of North Korea?

00:28:44.812 --> 00:28:46.687
-Yes.
-What?

00:28:46.770 --> 00:28:48.478
James Franco, Seth Rogen
here right now.

00:28:48.561 --> 00:28:51.728
And that's what the whole world
is doing right now, saying, "What?"

00:28:53.186 --> 00:28:55.103
I go to New York

00:28:55.186 --> 00:28:58.561
to, like, do the final week
of promotion for the film.

00:28:58.645 --> 00:29:00.144
It's a very weird thing to do.

00:29:00.228 --> 00:29:03.395
To promote a thing
that is causing the world

00:29:03.478 --> 00:29:05.228
distress at that moment.

00:29:05.311 --> 00:29:10.228
And that's when, like,
it really ratcheted up a notch.

00:29:10.311 --> 00:29:14.978
The hackers made a threat against
anyone who goes to see Sony's new film.

00:29:15.061 --> 00:29:18.770
This message warns movie-goers
to stay away from theaters.

00:29:18.853 --> 00:29:21.728
The group is threatening to deliver
what it calls its "Christmas gift."

00:29:21.812 --> 00:29:24.728
I literally got on a plane and left New
York in the middle of my press tour.

00:29:24.812 --> 00:29:26.645
I think I was, like,
on the way to do "Jimmy Fallon,"

00:29:26.728 --> 00:29:28.978
and I was like, "Let's
go to the airport. Like...

00:29:29.061 --> 00:29:31.269
I don't think this movie's
coming out, guys."

00:29:33.520 --> 00:29:36.269
And I went back to la,
and went to Sony,

00:29:36.353 --> 00:29:38.895
and was like, "what's the plan? Like,
is it gonna be pulled from theaters?

00:29:38.978 --> 00:29:41.978
It seems like people don't
want to play the movie anymore."

00:29:45.103 --> 00:29:48.603
When the email came out
that involved physical threats,

00:29:48.687 --> 00:29:52.103
there was a lot of conversations
with the theaters that happened

00:29:52.186 --> 00:29:55.269
where they were asking to
delay the release of the picture.

00:29:55.353 --> 00:30:00.019
I think Michael Lynton didn't
want to leave the theater owners,

00:30:00.103 --> 00:30:02.103
you know,
looking like the bad guy.

00:30:02.186 --> 00:30:04.395
So, he then was like,
"I'm gonna pull the movie.

00:30:04.478 --> 00:30:08.186
"I'm just gonna say...
it's... it's, it's pulled.

00:30:08.269 --> 00:30:10.645
"And we all need to come
as like a united front,

00:30:10.728 --> 00:30:12.395
and say that
that's what we want."

00:30:12.478 --> 00:30:14.561
And we were like,
"Absolutely not."

00:30:14.645 --> 00:30:18.311
Today, Sony cancelled
the Christmas day release

00:30:18.395 --> 00:30:19.436
of "the interview."

00:30:19.520 --> 00:30:20.728
The hackers win.

00:30:20.812 --> 00:30:22.061
I don't know
how else to frame it

00:30:22.144 --> 00:30:23.478
now that Sony has cancelled

00:30:23.561 --> 00:30:24.770
the release of "the interview,"

00:30:24.853 --> 00:30:25.978
that spoof about North Korea

00:30:26.061 --> 00:30:27.895
starring James Franco
and Seth Rogen.

00:30:29.728 --> 00:30:31.603
A couple days later,

00:30:31.687 --> 00:30:35.436
we were all gathered
in our bungalow on the Sony lot.

00:30:35.520 --> 00:30:37.812
And they were like, "There's
a press conference coming,

00:30:37.895 --> 00:30:39.687
and Obama's gonna
talk about it, I think."

00:30:39.770 --> 00:30:42.186
And we, we were like,
"He's not gonna talk about it."

00:30:42.269 --> 00:30:43.645
Like, and it was like
the first question.

00:30:43.728 --> 00:30:45.311
Thank you, Mr. President. Uh,

00:30:45.395 --> 00:30:47.186
let's start on North Korea,
'cause that seems to be

00:30:47.269 --> 00:30:48.812
the, uh, biggest topic today.

00:30:48.895 --> 00:30:53.144
Uh, what does a proportional
response look like,

00:30:53.228 --> 00:30:55.353
uh, to the Sony hack?

00:30:55.436 --> 00:30:58.853
The question at that time was,
well, how serious a deal is this?

00:30:58.937 --> 00:31:03.019
And before you knew it, it was
an international security incident

00:31:03.103 --> 00:31:05.603
that involved the president
of the United States.

00:31:07.561 --> 00:31:11.478
If North Korea
launched a missile

00:31:11.561 --> 00:31:14.019
into San Francisco,

00:31:14.103 --> 00:31:18.228
everybody knows what the United States
of America, our response would be.

00:31:18.311 --> 00:31:21.186
Right? That's a
physical-on-physical attack.

00:31:21.269 --> 00:31:24.311
But what is a
digital-on-digital attack,

00:31:24.395 --> 00:31:26.186
and what is the
appropriate response?

00:31:26.269 --> 00:31:29.269
John McCain at the time said,
"This is an act of war."

00:31:29.353 --> 00:31:32.395
It's a new form of warfare
that we're involved in,

00:31:32.478 --> 00:31:35.269
and we need to react,
and react vigorously.

00:31:35.353 --> 00:31:37.311
President Obama
didn't want to go there.

00:31:38.520 --> 00:31:40.561
When we were in
those conversations

00:31:40.645 --> 00:31:42.019
both in the
department of defense

00:31:42.103 --> 00:31:43.395
and in the white house,

00:31:43.478 --> 00:31:45.645
you fear that if you go too hard

00:31:45.728 --> 00:31:46.728
against the North Koreans,

00:31:46.812 --> 00:31:48.603
it becomes a real
military conflict.

00:31:48.687 --> 00:31:50.561
The last thing you want

00:31:50.645 --> 00:31:52.812
is to do something
that escalates it,

00:31:52.895 --> 00:31:54.895
and the North Koreans
then hit the US back

00:31:54.978 --> 00:31:56.353
in our critical
infrastructure, right?

00:31:56.436 --> 00:31:58.895
We didn't know whether
they were in the grid

00:31:58.978 --> 00:32:00.228
and could take something down.

00:32:00.311 --> 00:32:04.019
We will respond. Uh, we
will respond proportionally,

00:32:04.103 --> 00:32:07.186
and we'll respond, uh,
in a place and time,

00:32:07.269 --> 00:32:09.353
uh, and manner, that we choose.

00:32:09.436 --> 00:32:11.395
It's not something that
I will announce,

00:32:11.478 --> 00:32:13.061
uh, here today
at a press conference.

00:32:13.144 --> 00:32:15.853
No one really knows what the
US government did to North Korea.

00:32:15.937 --> 00:32:18.895
There are press reports
that suggest that

00:32:19.019 --> 00:32:20.478
not long after the Sony hack,

00:32:20.561 --> 00:32:22.812
suddenly, uh, North Korea's
internet went down.

00:32:22.895 --> 00:32:25.186
Even if it were the
United States government

00:32:25.269 --> 00:32:27.103
that shut down the Internet
of North Korea,

00:32:27.186 --> 00:32:29.937
at the time, North Korea
had 28 websites.

00:32:30.019 --> 00:32:32.269
So the United States
is far more vulnerable

00:32:32.353 --> 00:32:36.520
to cyber attacks than many of the
countries that are trying to attack us.

00:32:38.186 --> 00:32:40.395
The president
didn’t necessarily

00:32:40.478 --> 00:32:42.436
have a response to that,
to them,

00:32:42.520 --> 00:32:45.937
And so, he chose
to talk about Sony.

00:32:46.019 --> 00:32:48.061
We cannot have a society

00:32:48.144 --> 00:32:51.103
in which some dictator someplace

00:32:51.186 --> 00:32:55.436
can start imposing censorship
here in the United States.

00:32:55.520 --> 00:32:57.353
He was like, "Yeah,
theaters should play it."

00:32:57.436 --> 00:33:00.353
Um, "We shouldn't succumb
to these threats."

00:33:00.436 --> 00:33:02.937
And we were all like, "Great!"

00:33:03.019 --> 00:33:05.895
But everyone just bailed.

00:33:06.853 --> 00:33:08.311
There was certainly
disappointment

00:33:08.395 --> 00:33:09.687
on the part of the filmmakers

00:33:09.770 --> 00:33:11.853
that they weren't gonna
see the movie in, you know,

00:33:11.937 --> 00:33:13.645
in theaters
all across the country.

00:33:13.728 --> 00:33:16.645
We reassured them that we
intended to put the movie out.

00:33:16.728 --> 00:33:18.520
I called Eric Schmidt at Google.

00:33:18.603 --> 00:33:20.978
He and the folks at Google
felt that it was important

00:33:21.061 --> 00:33:25.436
that the picture get out, and they
offered to put it out on their platform.

00:33:31.353 --> 00:33:33.103
Ultimately,

00:33:33.186 --> 00:33:35.019
they let the theaters
who wanted to play it play it.

00:33:35.103 --> 00:33:37.770
It was in, like, 20 theaters
or something like that.

00:33:37.853 --> 00:33:40.353
Um, I think it is
still Google Play's

00:33:40.436 --> 00:33:42.853
number one ever
downloaded movie.

00:33:47.269 --> 00:33:50.603
And also, the scene
is released.

00:33:50.687 --> 00:33:52.645
"The Verge"
or something like that

00:33:52.728 --> 00:33:54.687
goes through the hacked footage,

00:33:54.770 --> 00:33:56.978
finds the shot of
Kim Jong-un's head exploding,

00:33:57.061 --> 00:34:01.103
and releases just that online
for everyone to just see.

00:34:06.603 --> 00:34:08.978
This was a big deal.

00:34:09.061 --> 00:34:11.478
That a country that is so poor,

00:34:11.561 --> 00:34:14.645
and has only ten percent of
its population with cell phones,

00:34:14.728 --> 00:34:16.937
could actually wage
a cyber attack

00:34:17.019 --> 00:34:19.478
against one of our most
powerful movie studios

00:34:19.561 --> 00:34:23.436
and a major corporation, and
create an international crisis.

00:34:28.019 --> 00:34:31.645
The Sony attack changed
the public’s perception

00:34:31.728 --> 00:34:33.687
of what a cyber attack was.

00:34:33.770 --> 00:34:35.853
Prior to Sony, people believed,

00:34:35.937 --> 00:34:39.353
"oh, somebody's trying to
steal my credit card information."

00:34:39.436 --> 00:34:43.853
"They're trying to steal my social
security in order to commit fraud."

00:34:43.937 --> 00:34:47.728
Sony was purely an attack
to destroy.

00:35:01.269 --> 00:35:04.103
2014 saw, for the first time,

00:35:04.186 --> 00:35:07.353
destructive cyber attacks
carried out on US soil

00:35:07.436 --> 00:35:09.186
by nation-state entities.

00:35:09.269 --> 00:35:11.395
Marked first by
the Iranian attack

00:35:11.478 --> 00:35:13.812
against the Las Vegas sands
casino corporation

00:35:13.895 --> 00:35:15.353
a year ago this month,

00:35:15.436 --> 00:35:19.186
and the North Korean attack
against Sony in November.

00:35:19.269 --> 00:35:22.436
While the both of these nations
have lesser technical capabilities

00:35:22.520 --> 00:35:24.853
in comparison to Russia
and China,

00:35:24.937 --> 00:35:27.436
these destructive attacks
demonstrate that

00:35:27.520 --> 00:35:32.436
Iran and North Korea are motivated
and unpredictable cyber actors.

00:35:32.520 --> 00:35:34.520
Russia and China
continue to develop

00:35:34.603 --> 00:35:37.103
very sophisticated
cyber programs.

00:35:37.186 --> 00:35:39.144
And while I can't go
into detail here,

00:35:39.228 --> 00:35:41.269
the Russian cyber threat
is more severe

00:35:41.353 --> 00:35:43.645
than we had previously assessed.

00:35:54.728 --> 00:35:57.895
These days, one must always
get hired by the lawyers,

00:35:57.978 --> 00:36:00.603
because the lawyers are the first
call of a company that gets hacked.

00:36:00.687 --> 00:36:02.937
Because there might be
lawsuits that would follow

00:36:03.019 --> 00:36:04.770
from, uh, from the announcement
over the breach,

00:36:04.853 --> 00:36:07.853
so, very, very typically we get
a call from a law firm that says,

00:36:07.937 --> 00:36:10.770
"One of our clients, uh,
thinks they may have an issue.

00:36:10.853 --> 00:36:11.978
Can you come in and help them?"

00:36:12.061 --> 00:36:13.853
In this case, it was the DNC.

00:36:16.937 --> 00:36:18.395
The call came on a Friday,

00:36:18.478 --> 00:36:20.812
so it took US a few days
for US to go into the network

00:36:20.895 --> 00:36:24.311
and find infected machines
on the network.

00:36:24.395 --> 00:36:25.978
This wasn't just on one system.

00:36:26.061 --> 00:36:29.144
There were hundreds of systems
that were being impacted.

00:36:30.353 --> 00:36:32.269
We start looking at the malware

00:36:32.353 --> 00:36:35.561
and immediately realized that this was
malware we had seen many times before.

00:36:35.645 --> 00:36:39.395
That we had high confidence
attribution to the GRU,

00:36:39.478 --> 00:36:41.645
the Russian
military intelligence.

00:36:45.937 --> 00:36:48.520
We're seeing them spread
from system to system,

00:36:48.603 --> 00:36:51.478
touch files, take those files
out of the network,

00:36:51.561 --> 00:36:53.770
stealing data,
monitoring everything.

00:36:53.853 --> 00:36:55.395
You can't just shut down
one machine

00:36:55.478 --> 00:36:56.937
because they're everywhere.

00:36:57.019 --> 00:36:59.186
So you have to shut
everything down, um,

00:36:59.269 --> 00:37:02.103
and spend several days
rebuilding all the infrastructure.

00:37:02.186 --> 00:37:05.937
We told, um, the DNC, "When do
you want us to do this remediation?"

00:37:07.603 --> 00:37:10.687
At the time, the primaries
were in full swing.

00:37:10.770 --> 00:37:13.395
Hillary Clinton had not yet
locked down her nomination,

00:37:13.478 --> 00:37:16.978
so they said, "Let's plan for
four or five weeks from now,

00:37:17.061 --> 00:37:20.228
um, when the primaries are
over and we're not under the gun."

00:37:20.311 --> 00:37:22.978
Waiting a few weeks
did not seem outrageous.

00:37:23.061 --> 00:37:24.395
Of course over
that period of time,

00:37:24.478 --> 00:37:25.978
the Russians continued
stealing documents,

00:37:26.061 --> 00:37:28.645
and we're sort of helplessly
watching them.

00:37:30.603 --> 00:37:34.395
I was really confused
and disturbed

00:37:34.478 --> 00:37:36.812
by what was happening.

00:37:36.895 --> 00:37:41.186
But initially, uh, the FBI
didn't take it all that seriously,

00:37:41.269 --> 00:37:44.770
and so, it wasn't rising
to the level of,

00:37:44.853 --> 00:37:49.061
of urgent, you know,
five-alarm fire, uh, drill.

00:37:49.144 --> 00:37:51.269
I want to congratulate
Hillary Clinton

00:37:51.353 --> 00:37:55.144
on making history as the
presumptive Democratic nominee

00:37:55.228 --> 00:37:58.103
-for president of
the United States.

00:37:58.186 --> 00:38:00.603
Finally, in June of 2016,

00:38:00.687 --> 00:38:03.019
we kicked the Russians
out of the DNC network.

00:38:03.103 --> 00:38:04.520
This just in to CNN.

00:38:04.603 --> 00:38:06.937
Russian hackers
managed to infiltrate

00:38:07.019 --> 00:38:09.603
the computer network at the
Democratic National Committee.

00:38:09.687 --> 00:38:13.103
The researchers were roaming
around the network for about a year,

00:38:13.186 --> 00:38:15.269
but were removed this weekend.

00:38:15.353 --> 00:38:16.687
We've talked to DNC officials.

00:38:16.770 --> 00:38:19.520
We've also talked to the outside
firm that the DNC brought in

00:38:19.603 --> 00:38:21.520
when they recognized
that there was an issue here.

00:38:21.603 --> 00:38:22.978
That firm called CrowdStrike.

00:38:23.061 --> 00:38:26.186
There was a small blip on
the, on the, on the news cycle

00:38:26.269 --> 00:38:29.144
that day, of, "Oh,
Russia's hacking the DNC,"

00:38:29.228 --> 00:38:31.645
but national media
moved on within hours,

00:38:31.728 --> 00:38:34.520
and, uh, I thought that was
gonna be the end of the story.

00:38:37.186 --> 00:38:41.395
But then on the Eve of the
Democratic national convention...

00:38:43.520 --> 00:38:46.395
Wikileaks dumps the emails.

00:38:49.061 --> 00:38:51.978
Good evening. Their party's
chairman off the program,

00:38:52.061 --> 00:38:53.978
an apparent Russian email hack,

00:38:54.061 --> 00:38:56.478
and now a revolt among
Bernie Sanders supporters.

00:38:56.561 --> 00:39:00.019
Welcome to day one of the
Democratic National Convention.

00:39:02.228 --> 00:39:05.353
The information stolen
from those servers in the DNC,

00:39:05.436 --> 00:39:07.728
suddenly it begins to
surface in this way

00:39:07.812 --> 00:39:09.770
that was presaged by
the Sony attack,

00:39:09.853 --> 00:39:11.019
and the Sands Corp attack.

00:39:11.103 --> 00:39:12.812
emails released by wikileaks,

00:39:12.895 --> 00:39:16.228
proving the DNC had favored
Hillary Clinton over Sanders.

00:39:16.311 --> 00:39:19.186
Comes out through WikiLeaks, which
makes everything searchable so you'd be,

00:39:19.269 --> 00:39:21.520
you know, there'll be a dump
of 20,000 emails

00:39:21.603 --> 00:39:23.603
and you just type in some names
if you're a reporter,

00:39:23.687 --> 00:39:25.061
and suddenly you've got a story.

00:39:25.144 --> 00:39:26.853
The thousands of hacked emails

00:39:26.937 --> 00:39:28.103
leaked to wikileaks

00:39:28.186 --> 00:39:30.353
rocked the Democratic
national committee.

00:39:31.853 --> 00:39:33.061
I'm so proud--

00:39:35.478 --> 00:39:37.561
One of the things
they were doing

00:39:37.645 --> 00:39:43.728
was trying to stir up trouble
between the Bernie delegates

00:39:43.812 --> 00:39:45.728
and, and, and our forces.

00:39:45.812 --> 00:39:48.269
Bernie Sanders supporters
say the emails proved

00:39:48.353 --> 00:39:50.812
the party favored
Hillary Clinton all along.

00:39:50.895 --> 00:39:52.812
It just validated
everything we thought.

00:39:52.895 --> 00:39:55.520
That this was completely rigged
right from the beginning.

00:39:55.603 --> 00:39:58.269
By using that stolen material,

00:39:58.353 --> 00:40:01.937
the media injected the idea that
the DNC had rigged the entire process

00:40:02.019 --> 00:40:04.311
against Bernie Sanders.
And there's a kernel of truth.

00:40:04.395 --> 00:40:07.812
Clearly there are people in the
DNC who didn't like Bernie Sanders.

00:40:07.895 --> 00:40:09.603
But that doesn't mean
the whole process is rigged.

00:40:09.687 --> 00:40:12.770
And the media allowed them to go
from the kernel of truth

00:40:12.853 --> 00:40:14.728
to the conventional wisdom,

00:40:14.812 --> 00:40:16.353
Because it sold papers,

00:40:16.436 --> 00:40:19.561
and it got people to watch TV.

00:40:19.645 --> 00:40:23.478
But they were amplifying the messages
that the Russians wanted amplified.

00:40:26.311 --> 00:40:28.728
In that pile of information

00:40:28.812 --> 00:40:30.395
that's come from the DNC,

00:40:30.478 --> 00:40:33.978
there were some documents that
were campaign finance documents

00:40:34.061 --> 00:40:35.895
from the campaign that would--

00:40:35.978 --> 00:40:39.061
had been unlikely
to be at the DNC.

00:40:39.853 --> 00:40:42.937
So, the campaign
began to look at

00:40:43.019 --> 00:40:45.019
where might those
have originated.

00:40:47.520 --> 00:40:48.978
turned out, in the spring,

00:40:49.061 --> 00:40:51.937
one of my colleagues who
had access to my email account

00:40:52.019 --> 00:40:55.228
had seen what was
a fairly professional

00:40:55.311 --> 00:40:59.561
phishing operation,
looking to be from Google.

00:41:00.520 --> 00:41:02.853
She reported that to the people

00:41:02.937 --> 00:41:06.728
in the tech security side
of the campaign.

00:41:06.812 --> 00:41:13.269
He sent back an email to my
assistant saying that it was real,

00:41:13.353 --> 00:41:16.019
and that I should change
my credentials.

00:41:16.770 --> 00:41:18.812
She then clicked on the link,

00:41:18.895 --> 00:41:22.561
and that's how I was hacked
by the Russians.

00:41:22.645 --> 00:41:26.395
But at that point, we weren't sure
what the extent of the breach had been.

00:41:30.019 --> 00:41:32.978
In the summer and fall of 2016,

00:41:33.061 --> 00:41:35.978
there were many meetings
about the Russians.

00:41:36.061 --> 00:41:39.895
There was a lot of
back and forth about what to do.

00:41:40.978 --> 00:41:43.269
We began to get information

00:41:43.353 --> 00:41:47.895
about cyber activity that was focused
on our voter registration databases.

00:41:49.353 --> 00:41:52.812
And we realized that it was
probably about disrupting

00:41:52.895 --> 00:41:55.311
the integrity of that data.

00:41:55.395 --> 00:41:58.311
The Russians could go into
a voter registration database

00:41:58.395 --> 00:41:59.937
and change that data,

00:42:00.019 --> 00:42:03.353
so that on election day,
when voters show up to vote,

00:42:03.436 --> 00:42:05.186
they are turned away.

00:42:05.269 --> 00:42:07.019
There is chaos
at the voting place,

00:42:07.103 --> 00:42:10.228
because the name doesn't
match the identification,

00:42:10.311 --> 00:42:13.978
and you could
disrupt election day

00:42:14.061 --> 00:42:16.061
to the degree that
the American public

00:42:16.144 --> 00:42:18.520
would doubt the legitimacy
of the process,

00:42:18.603 --> 00:42:22.395
and then potentially,
the legitimacy of the outcome.

00:42:24.144 --> 00:42:27.561
That's what Obama's focus was.

00:42:27.645 --> 00:42:30.770
When Obama saw putin
in September,

00:42:31.436 --> 00:42:34.228
he basically threatened him

00:42:34.311 --> 00:42:36.853
that if they tried
something like that,

00:42:36.937 --> 00:42:39.478
there'd be severe consequences.

00:42:39.561 --> 00:42:42.436
What I think they
underappreciated

00:42:42.520 --> 00:42:46.603
was how much effect the Russians
could have from the hacking,

00:42:46.687 --> 00:42:50.436
and from their massive
disinformation operation.

00:42:54.228 --> 00:42:56.103
During the election,

00:42:56.186 --> 00:42:58.144
we had a dedicated team
at Facebook

00:42:58.228 --> 00:43:00.853
whose job it was to
look for Russian actors.

00:43:00.937 --> 00:43:05.436
And we had found GRU activity.
We had found DCLeaks.

00:43:05.520 --> 00:43:07.269
We had found them pushing
disinformation,

00:43:07.353 --> 00:43:08.645
but not really at scale.

00:43:08.728 --> 00:43:10.478
And we didn't really understand

00:43:10.561 --> 00:43:13.520
what was behind the vast
majority of this fake news.

00:43:14.978 --> 00:43:17.019
But right after the election,

00:43:17.103 --> 00:43:19.228
we took all of the
political ads that were run

00:43:19.311 --> 00:43:21.436
in the United States
in the year before the election.

00:43:21.520 --> 00:43:24.103
And then we figured out all the
accounts that were possibly tied to it.

00:43:24.186 --> 00:43:27.186
So this is the people who
ran the ad, but then also,

00:43:27.269 --> 00:43:29.895
people who used the same
computer as the person who ran an ad.

00:43:29.978 --> 00:43:33.269
Or people who have used the same
phone as the person who ran the ad.

00:43:33.353 --> 00:43:35.311
And then for every single one
of those accounts,

00:43:35.395 --> 00:43:37.728
we looked for possible links
to Russia.

00:43:37.812 --> 00:43:40.728
We start pulling that thread, and
then we eventually find this cluster

00:43:40.812 --> 00:43:43.853
that we can all link together, and
that was the Internet Research Agency.

00:43:51.395 --> 00:43:53.228
The Internet research
agency, llc

00:43:53.311 --> 00:43:55.770
is basically a building
in St. Petersburg

00:43:55.853 --> 00:43:57.853
with a bunch of trolls
sitting there

00:43:57.937 --> 00:44:01.353
trying to drive divisions
in US society.

00:44:01.436 --> 00:44:03.978
It's existed for years
and years at this point.

00:44:04.061 --> 00:44:06.478
And they've done
propaganda work in Russia,

00:44:06.561 --> 00:44:08.978
and Ukraine, and the like.

00:44:09.061 --> 00:44:12.812
The ira specifically sent people
to the United States to study

00:44:12.895 --> 00:44:15.144
the political sphere in the US

00:44:15.228 --> 00:44:17.353
and to understand what
the pressure points were.

00:44:17.770 --> 00:44:19.353
So in 2016,

00:44:19.436 --> 00:44:21.728
they were creating
these fake American personas,

00:44:21.812 --> 00:44:25.144
and then running ads
as political groups.

00:44:34.728 --> 00:44:36.561
The depth of the content
was surprising.

00:44:36.645 --> 00:44:39.978
Our assumption was that all of this
content would be on one side, politically.

00:44:40.061 --> 00:44:42.269
But what they had done
very effectively

00:44:42.353 --> 00:44:44.520
was find a friction point

00:44:44.603 --> 00:44:47.061
and then try to manipulate
people on both sides.

00:44:48.478 --> 00:44:50.978
The number-one topic was
actually black lives matter.

00:44:51.061 --> 00:44:54.061
They created a fake persona
to pretend to be

00:44:54.144 --> 00:44:56.645
a pro-black lives matter
activist.

00:44:57.311 --> 00:44:58.978
And to push narratives

00:44:59.061 --> 00:45:01.144
that both would maybe radicalize

00:45:01.228 --> 00:45:02.812
people who were supportive
of black lives matter,

00:45:02.895 --> 00:45:04.645
but also look radical

00:45:04.728 --> 00:45:06.103
to more moderate people

00:45:06.186 --> 00:45:08.061
who could say, like,
"oh, look at these people.

00:45:08.144 --> 00:45:11.436
Yeah, they're, they're
they're really nuts."

00:45:11.520 --> 00:45:14.687
They even, in a couple of cases,
tried to create protests

00:45:14.770 --> 00:45:17.186
where a pro-immigration group
and an anti-immigration group

00:45:17.269 --> 00:45:21.687
protest one another by inviting people
to events that were at the same time.

00:45:21.770 --> 00:45:24.895
Down with the racists!
Down with the Nazis!

00:45:31.770 --> 00:45:33.895
We were surprised that

00:45:33.978 --> 00:45:36.061
putin would care so much

00:45:36.144 --> 00:45:39.269
about who the
next president was.

00:45:39.353 --> 00:45:43.770
That he was so intent
upon damaging me,

00:45:43.853 --> 00:45:45.436
Damaging my campaign,

00:45:45.520 --> 00:45:49.103
preventing me, if he could,
from becoming president.

00:45:49.186 --> 00:45:51.978
And also how adept they were

00:45:52.061 --> 00:45:55.561
in sowing disinformation,
misinformation.

00:45:55.645 --> 00:45:58.478
It was unlike anything
we'd ever seen.

00:46:01.311 --> 00:46:03.436
None of us kind of
conceptualized this

00:46:03.520 --> 00:46:06.269
as the kind of groups
we should be looking for.

00:46:07.144 --> 00:46:09.186
Intelligence teams
at the companies,

00:46:09.269 --> 00:46:11.728
and in places like NSA
and the US government,

00:46:11.812 --> 00:46:15.061
were focused on very
traditional threat actors.

00:46:18.353 --> 00:46:21.478
General clapper's this old
cold warrior.

00:46:21.561 --> 00:46:25.228
Grew up as the son of
an air force officer,

00:46:25.311 --> 00:46:27.728
becomes an air force
intelligence officer.

00:46:27.812 --> 00:46:31.770
And yet, the cyber conflicts

00:46:31.853 --> 00:46:34.269
that are springing up
during his time

00:46:34.353 --> 00:46:36.436
as director of
National Intelligence

00:46:36.520 --> 00:46:38.853
Are an entirely different
kind of threat

00:46:38.937 --> 00:46:41.770
that he's just trying
to keep on top of.

00:46:41.853 --> 00:46:44.144
And time and time again,

00:46:44.228 --> 00:46:47.770
he keeps getting caught
by surprise.

00:46:47.853 --> 00:46:49.561
It's not his fault.

00:46:49.645 --> 00:46:53.103
We had never built
an intelligence network

00:46:53.186 --> 00:46:55.603
designed to pick this stuff up.

00:46:55.687 --> 00:46:58.561
But there he is in North Korea

00:46:58.645 --> 00:47:00.978
while the North Koreans
are inside Sony.

00:47:01.061 --> 00:47:04.019
And there he was,
sitting on a system

00:47:04.103 --> 00:47:06.728
that failed to raise
a timely alarm

00:47:06.812 --> 00:47:08.645
to the president
of the United States

00:47:08.728 --> 00:47:12.144
that the Russians were inside
the Democratic national committee.

00:47:12.228 --> 00:47:14.186
Much less inside Facebook.

00:47:19.728 --> 00:47:23.937
You know, 20/20 hindsight,
it's all, it's perfect vision.

00:47:24.019 --> 00:47:28.311
At the time, there was concern
about publicizing this,

00:47:28.395 --> 00:47:32.770
because by doing so, we'd
simply amplify its importance.

00:47:32.853 --> 00:47:35.812
And I think, as well,
there was reluctance

00:47:35.895 --> 00:47:38.520
to be seen by the
last administration as

00:47:38.603 --> 00:47:40.436
putting its hand on the scale

00:47:40.520 --> 00:47:43.520
in favor of one candidate,
or appearing to do that,

00:47:43.603 --> 00:47:45.645
To the disfavor of the other.

00:47:45.728 --> 00:47:47.687
The system, folks, is rigged.

00:47:47.770 --> 00:47:51.353
It's a rigged, disgusting,
dirty system.

00:47:51.436 --> 00:47:53.395
It's a dirty system.

00:47:54.269 --> 00:47:56.520
Then candidate Trump
was alleging

00:47:56.603 --> 00:47:59.311
that if he didn't win
the election, it was rigged.

00:47:59.395 --> 00:48:01.186
So, there was reluctance to,

00:48:01.269 --> 00:48:04.144
you know, to play to that--
to play to that narrative.

00:48:08.144 --> 00:48:10.728
But the magnitude of what
the Russians were doing

00:48:10.812 --> 00:48:14.061
grew both in expanse
and clarity.

00:48:14.144 --> 00:48:16.353
And on the 7th of October,

00:48:16.436 --> 00:48:18.770
we finally came out
with a public statement,

00:48:18.853 --> 00:48:20.645
which was a pretty
forthcoming statement

00:48:20.728 --> 00:48:22.353
about the Russian interference.

00:48:22.436 --> 00:48:24.395
there's more breaking news
we're following tonight.

00:48:24.478 --> 00:48:26.728
The United States
now openly saying

00:48:26.812 --> 00:48:30.395
that Russia is directly behind
a series of cyber attacks

00:48:30.478 --> 00:48:33.061
targeting the upcoming
presidential election.

00:48:33.144 --> 00:48:36.061
Well, unfortunately our message
was completely emasculated.

00:48:36.144 --> 00:48:39.395
A recording of Donald Trump
made more than a decade ago...

00:48:39.478 --> 00:48:43.269
Because that's the same day that the
"Access Hollywood" audio tape came out.

00:48:43.353 --> 00:48:45.311
You won't want young children
to hear it.

00:48:53.395 --> 00:48:56.395
The letter from the intelligence
community comes out.

00:48:56.478 --> 00:48:58.728
The "Access Hollywood"
tape comes out

00:48:58.812 --> 00:49:00.436
all in one day.

00:49:00.520 --> 00:49:03.269
And WikiLeaks starts
dumping my emails

00:49:03.353 --> 00:49:06.144
an hour after the "Access
Hollywood" tape comes out.

00:49:06.228 --> 00:49:08.478
You can judge whether
that's a coincidence.

00:49:08.561 --> 00:49:10.520
Two thousand more emails
have been posted online,

00:49:10.603 --> 00:49:12.103
apparently from
the hacked account

00:49:12.186 --> 00:49:14.395
Of Hillary Clinton's
campaign chairman John podesta.

00:49:14.478 --> 00:49:18.269
Thousands of hacked emails from
her campaign chairman, John Podesta.

00:49:18.353 --> 00:49:19.937
Third installment
of the hacked emails

00:49:20.019 --> 00:49:22.603
from Hillary Clinton's
campaign chairman John Podesta,

00:49:22.687 --> 00:49:24.520
and so far, the messages
have provided a look

00:49:24.603 --> 00:49:26.978
into the inner workings
of the Clinton camp.

00:49:27.061 --> 00:49:31.812
Most of those ended up
being of little import.

00:49:34.645 --> 00:49:36.395
I'm a boring sort of guy.

00:49:36.478 --> 00:49:38.561
One email reveals
a disagreement

00:49:38.645 --> 00:49:40.687
between top Clinton aide
huma abedin

00:49:40.770 --> 00:49:43.103
and podesta over Clinton's
press strategy.

00:49:43.186 --> 00:49:44.770
A lot of this was gossip.

00:49:44.853 --> 00:49:46.937
In another email,
a longtime Clinton aide

00:49:47.019 --> 00:49:50.144
refers to Chelsea Clinton
as a, quote, "spoiled brat."

00:49:50.228 --> 00:49:53.687
But people thought, well,
if it's secret,

00:49:53.770 --> 00:49:55.687
or if it's stolen,

00:49:55.770 --> 00:49:57.978
it must be more sexy.

00:49:58.061 --> 00:49:59.770
It's kind of shadowy.

00:49:59.853 --> 00:50:01.978
"They didn't want you
to know this much."

00:50:02.061 --> 00:50:03.770
Like any good peek
behind the curtains,

00:50:03.853 --> 00:50:06.812
they show things the campaign
obviously would rather keep under wraps.

00:50:06.895 --> 00:50:08.978
The Clinton emails
are fascinating

00:50:09.061 --> 00:50:10.728
and hilarious reading
in some ways.

00:50:10.812 --> 00:50:12.853
So is it more like "Veep"
or is it more like "West Wing"?

00:50:12.937 --> 00:50:16.144
We were very frustrated.

00:50:16.228 --> 00:50:19.311
The fact that this was
a hostile foreign government

00:50:19.395 --> 00:50:21.103
interfering in the election

00:50:21.186 --> 00:50:25.353
was never really part of
what the coverage was.

00:50:25.436 --> 00:50:28.103
I would just add, you know, this
should be of concern to everyone

00:50:28.186 --> 00:50:31.812
that the Russians are trying to
influence our election.

00:50:31.895 --> 00:50:34.561
You know, everybody
was clearly informed

00:50:34.645 --> 00:50:37.019
about my email mistakes,
but they didn't know

00:50:37.103 --> 00:50:40.436
there was an active campaign
against us by the Russians.

00:50:40.520 --> 00:50:43.812
they did not know that
the trump campaign had personnel

00:50:43.895 --> 00:50:47.103
associated with it, who
were also being investigated.

00:50:47.186 --> 00:50:50.353
If you look at trump's campaign
the last month,

00:50:50.436 --> 00:50:53.687
he mentioned WikiLeaks
over 160 times.

00:50:53.770 --> 00:50:56.687
And they used the most perverse

00:50:56.770 --> 00:50:59.853
Twisting of anything
in John podesta's emails

00:50:59.937 --> 00:51:02.645
to create controversy,

00:51:02.728 --> 00:51:05.186
and, uh, sow distrust.

00:51:05.269 --> 00:51:08.687
A Russian news outlet just totally
misrepresented one of these emails,

00:51:08.770 --> 00:51:10.061
and then Donald Trump read it.

00:51:10.144 --> 00:51:11.687
She's now admitting that
they could have

00:51:11.770 --> 00:51:13.228
done something about Benghazi.

00:51:13.311 --> 00:51:15.228
This just came out
a little while ago.

00:51:15.311 --> 00:51:17.269
There was, like,
an email story every day,

00:51:17.353 --> 00:51:20.895
and then Comey drops
this hand grenade on us.

00:51:20.978 --> 00:51:22.895
The October surprise
came in the form

00:51:22.978 --> 00:51:25.186
of a three-paragraph
letter to congress

00:51:25.269 --> 00:51:27.103
from FBI director James comey,

00:51:27.186 --> 00:51:30.061
who wrote that agents
on an unrelated case

00:51:30.144 --> 00:51:32.061
had learned of the
existence of emails

00:51:32.144 --> 00:51:35.144
that appear to be pertinent
to the Clinton investigation.

00:51:35.228 --> 00:51:37.353
It's the wilderness
of mirrors now,

00:51:37.436 --> 00:51:39.728
in terms of investigation
upon investigation.

00:51:39.812 --> 00:51:42.812
We have to investigate
Hillary Clinton,

00:51:42.895 --> 00:51:47.353
and we have to investigate
the investigation.

00:51:47.436 --> 00:51:49.895
This is out of
a Russian playbook.

00:51:49.978 --> 00:51:52.395
"When nothing is real,
everything is possible,"

00:51:52.478 --> 00:51:53.895
as one of Putin's critics said.

00:51:53.978 --> 00:51:55.978
I don't think anybody knows
it was Russia

00:51:56.061 --> 00:51:58.812
that broke into the DNC. She's
saying Russia, Russia, Russia.

00:51:58.895 --> 00:52:00.561
But I don't-- Maybe it was.

00:52:00.645 --> 00:52:02.603
It also could be somebody
sitting on their bed

00:52:02.687 --> 00:52:05.269
that weighs 400 pounds, okay?

00:52:05.353 --> 00:52:07.687
It begins to kind of

00:52:07.770 --> 00:52:10.770
destroy any trust
that people have.

00:52:10.853 --> 00:52:12.228
Do you make the same commitment

00:52:12.311 --> 00:52:14.937
that you will absolutely accept
the result of this election?

00:52:15.019 --> 00:52:16.812
I will look at it at the time.

00:52:16.895 --> 00:52:20.812
And that really destroys
the credibility of democracy.

00:52:20.895 --> 00:52:22.978
That's what Putin wants.

00:52:27.144 --> 00:52:31.728
We look at our electronic
superimposed map of the nation

00:52:31.812 --> 00:52:34.603
here out back
30 rockefeller Plaza

00:52:34.687 --> 00:52:37.520
in New York,
where the sun will be rising,

00:52:37.603 --> 00:52:40.770
uh, on the president-elect
Donald John trump

00:52:40.853 --> 00:52:42.937
of queens, New York.

00:52:53.228 --> 00:52:55.853
I felt like, you know,
my insides had fallen out.

00:52:55.937 --> 00:53:00.103
It's like, I mean...
devastating.

00:53:06.353 --> 00:53:10.061
For months, the newly elected
president is under fire

00:53:10.144 --> 00:53:12.520
for how he's dealing
with Russia.

00:53:12.603 --> 00:53:14.019
I know a lot about hacking.

00:53:14.103 --> 00:53:16.061
And hacking is a very
hard thing to prove.

00:53:16.144 --> 00:53:17.687
So, it could be somebody else.

00:53:17.770 --> 00:53:21.269
And I also know things that
other people don't know,

00:53:21.353 --> 00:53:26.395
and so, they cannot be sure
of this situation.

00:53:26.478 --> 00:53:31.353
And everybody is awaiting his
first meeting ever with Vladimir Putin.

00:53:31.436 --> 00:53:33.770
Which took place in
Hamburg, Germany.

00:53:35.269 --> 00:53:37.019
So we all fly into Hamburg.

00:53:37.103 --> 00:53:39.728
Trump meets putin, first time.

00:53:39.812 --> 00:53:41.520
Has a long conversation
with him.

00:53:41.603 --> 00:53:43.520
Then at the dinner that night,

00:53:43.603 --> 00:53:46.353
goes off and has a separate
conversation with him

00:53:46.436 --> 00:53:48.353
that no one else has witnessed.

00:53:48.436 --> 00:53:52.770
President Putin and I have been
discussing various things,

00:53:52.853 --> 00:53:54.395
and I think it's going
very well.

00:53:54.478 --> 00:53:57.061
We've had some very,
very good talks.

00:53:57.144 --> 00:53:59.395
I head back to my hotel room,

00:53:59.478 --> 00:54:03.228
and as I'm checking out,
my cell phone rings.

00:54:03.311 --> 00:54:04.978
It's the president.

00:54:05.061 --> 00:54:09.061
"David, I just had the most
remarkable conversation

00:54:09.144 --> 00:54:10.853
"with Vladimir Putin.

00:54:10.937 --> 00:54:13.186
"And he tells me,

00:54:13.269 --> 00:54:14.895
"that if it had been
the Russians

00:54:14.978 --> 00:54:17.561
"who had meddled
in the election,

00:54:17.645 --> 00:54:19.645
"we never would have seen them.

00:54:19.728 --> 00:54:21.395
"And therefore,
it couldn't have been them,

00:54:21.478 --> 00:54:22.853
"because they wouldn't
have been this sloppy.

00:54:22.937 --> 00:54:25.978
"You write about this stuff.
You know about all of this.

00:54:26.061 --> 00:54:28.061
He must be right."

00:54:28.144 --> 00:54:31.395
The president was actually
looking for affirmation.

00:54:31.478 --> 00:54:35.353
He was looking for
any way to deny

00:54:35.436 --> 00:54:37.812
or cast doubt about
the question of whether

00:54:37.895 --> 00:54:40.353
the Russians
were behind the hack.

00:54:40.436 --> 00:54:42.478
And at that moment you knew

00:54:42.561 --> 00:54:44.353
that the United States
government

00:54:44.436 --> 00:54:46.728
was not going to organize itself

00:54:46.812 --> 00:54:49.103
to push back on the Russians.

00:54:55.353 --> 00:54:57.311
Let's be clear from the outset.

00:54:57.395 --> 00:55:01.103
This is unlike any cyber attack
that we have seen before.

00:55:01.186 --> 00:55:03.269
We want to start on this
Wednesday morning

00:55:03.353 --> 00:55:04.603
with that crippling
cyber attack.

00:55:04.687 --> 00:55:06.520
It's a new form of ransomware...

00:55:06.603 --> 00:55:08.645
It is hitting companies
around the world

00:55:08.728 --> 00:55:12.186
holding their computer systems
hostage for money.

00:55:12.269 --> 00:55:16.395
In 2017, shortly after
trump came into office,

00:55:16.478 --> 00:55:19.103
we saw a dramatic escalation

00:55:19.186 --> 00:55:23.978
in the scale and the scope
and the nature of cyber attacks.

00:55:24.061 --> 00:55:28.311
There was a massive
ransomware attack called "notpetya"

00:55:28.395 --> 00:55:31.186
that started in Ukraine.

00:55:34.311 --> 00:55:36.728
It was June 2017.

00:55:36.812 --> 00:55:40.478
I'm deputy head of the
presidential administration.

00:55:40.561 --> 00:55:44.895
Took a few days' vacation to drop
my, uh, kids to the summer camp.

00:55:44.978 --> 00:55:48.061
And in the morning, I start receiving
text messages from my team.

00:55:48.978 --> 00:55:51.895
"We think Ukraine
is under attack."

00:55:51.978 --> 00:55:54.395
"Our infrastructure
is registering attacks.

00:55:54.478 --> 00:55:57.019
The virus is destroying
computers."

00:55:57.103 --> 00:55:59.019
You know, atm machines
were not working.

00:55:59.103 --> 00:56:01.978
Hospitals reported
their computers being down.

00:56:02.061 --> 00:56:05.353
TV station, grocery stores...

00:56:05.436 --> 00:56:09.144
It was devastating.
It was spreading like fire.

00:56:10.561 --> 00:56:13.770
Ukraine is Vladimir putin's
petri dish.

00:56:13.853 --> 00:56:18.353
It's where he experiments
on every single technique

00:56:18.436 --> 00:56:22.395
that he ultimately ended up
using in the United States.

00:56:22.478 --> 00:56:25.395
Breaking into emails,
and making them public.

00:56:25.478 --> 00:56:29.228
Sowing chaos
with disinformation.

00:56:29.311 --> 00:56:32.687
Russia was constantly testing
different strategies,

00:56:32.770 --> 00:56:35.186
and different approaches,
in Ukraine.

00:56:35.269 --> 00:56:37.353
attacks on the electrical grid,

00:56:37.436 --> 00:56:40.061
2015, 2016.

00:56:40.144 --> 00:56:43.186
Attack on the transportation
infrastructure.

00:56:43.269 --> 00:56:47.395
Odessa airport,
Ukrainian subway in Kiev.

00:56:47.478 --> 00:56:50.353
You don't see the regular war.

00:56:50.436 --> 00:56:54.311
But war is taking place,
and it's devastating.

00:56:55.311 --> 00:56:57.228
With its notpetya attack,

00:56:57.311 --> 00:56:59.228
what the Russians
didn't count on

00:56:59.311 --> 00:57:02.228
is that the spreading
algorithms that they put in

00:57:02.311 --> 00:57:03.853
were so aggressive that

00:57:03.937 --> 00:57:06.395
it wouldn't just contain itself
to the network of one company.

00:57:06.478 --> 00:57:09.228
any firms with any
links to Ukraine

00:57:09.311 --> 00:57:12.645
are being contaminated
by this contagious virus.

00:57:12.728 --> 00:57:16.395
It would quickly jump out,
and compromise contractors,

00:57:16.478 --> 00:57:18.395
other networks that you
may be connected with.

00:57:18.478 --> 00:57:21.061
It escapes the box, and it
begins to hit the corporations

00:57:21.144 --> 00:57:22.603
and companies
all around the world.

00:57:22.687 --> 00:57:24.978
Maersk shipping was one.

00:57:25.061 --> 00:57:26.853
Fedex was another.

00:57:26.937 --> 00:57:29.436
They lost hundreds of millions
of dollars of business

00:57:29.520 --> 00:57:32.186
just from the loss
of business operations

00:57:32.269 --> 00:57:34.311
and the money they had
to pay to remediate

00:57:34.395 --> 00:57:36.687
the damage to their systems.

00:57:37.687 --> 00:57:39.978
There was one other aspect

00:57:40.061 --> 00:57:42.186
to the notpetya attacks

00:57:42.269 --> 00:57:46.144
that made this story
really complicated.

00:57:46.228 --> 00:57:49.561
It turned out that
a component of the attacks

00:57:49.645 --> 00:57:53.061
had relied on code
that had been stolen

00:57:53.144 --> 00:57:56.311
from inside the NSA.

00:57:57.228 --> 00:57:59.144
In the summer of 2016,

00:57:59.228 --> 00:58:02.812
a group that called itself
theshadowbrokers

00:58:02.895 --> 00:58:07.228
began posting thousands
of lines of this code

00:58:07.311 --> 00:58:09.770
to make it clear to the NSA

00:58:09.853 --> 00:58:12.353
that they had the crown jewels.

00:58:13.561 --> 00:58:16.269
Before long, the North Koreans

00:58:16.353 --> 00:58:18.645
used parts of the
shadowbrokers code

00:58:18.728 --> 00:58:22.687
when they attacked with
a weapon called wannacry.

00:58:22.770 --> 00:58:25.687
This specific worm that was
leaked from the NSA's toolkit

00:58:25.770 --> 00:58:27.103
targeted Microsoft windows.

00:58:27.186 --> 00:58:29.144
Windows-based computers
in the US

00:58:29.228 --> 00:58:32.353
and across the globe
could be at risk.

00:58:35.645 --> 00:58:38.395
I will always remember
on that morning,

00:58:38.478 --> 00:58:41.728
sitting in the meeting of
Microsoft's senior leadership team.

00:58:41.812 --> 00:58:44.353
And all of a sudden,
people are seeing emails

00:58:44.436 --> 00:58:45.978
pop up on their screen.

00:58:46.061 --> 00:58:49.353
Reports from one customer
after another. "What's going on?"

00:58:49.436 --> 00:58:53.269
We're getting details of this massive
international cyber attack today.

00:58:53.353 --> 00:58:56.812
Hackers demanding money
have paralyzed computers

00:58:56.895 --> 00:58:59.853
In at least 99 countries.

00:58:59.937 --> 00:59:01.937
You could almost see this worm

00:59:02.019 --> 00:59:03.978
moving with the time zones

00:59:04.061 --> 00:59:08.228
across the Atlantic ocean
from Europe to North America.

00:59:11.019 --> 00:59:14.311
It was as if we had lost
the blueprints

00:59:14.395 --> 00:59:16.353
for an American missile.

00:59:16.436 --> 00:59:20.228
The North Koreans
and the Russians had grabbed it,

00:59:20.311 --> 00:59:22.728
improved upon it,
designed a prototype,

00:59:22.812 --> 00:59:27.478
and shot it back at
American allies and friends.

00:59:27.561 --> 00:59:31.728
It attacked 155 countries
in one day.

00:59:31.812 --> 00:59:34.103
In the history of humanity,

00:59:34.186 --> 00:59:37.978
no weapon has ever been fired
by a single country

00:59:38.061 --> 00:59:41.978
in a way that hit so many
other nations simultaneously.

00:59:44.561 --> 00:59:47.186
The volume of attacks
is escalating.

00:59:47.269 --> 00:59:50.561
The sophistication
of attacks is escalating.

00:59:50.645 --> 00:59:53.853
And the debate about
how to go deal with it

00:59:53.937 --> 00:59:57.019
is only getting
more and more confusing.

01:00:06.478 --> 01:00:09.436
It was my first day
as council president.

01:00:09.520 --> 01:00:11.478
It was about 12 o'clock
in the morning.

01:00:11.561 --> 01:00:14.520
I'm on my work phone
and I try to get into my email,

01:00:14.603 --> 01:00:16.186
and it doesn't work.

01:00:16.269 --> 01:00:18.937
And then I get onto my
Surface Pro, and it doesn't work.

01:00:19.019 --> 01:00:21.520
And so I start to call some
other folks that I knew would be up

01:00:21.603 --> 01:00:23.687
and I was told that
we had been hacked.

01:00:24.978 --> 01:00:27.603
We had been hit by
a ransomware attack.

01:00:27.687 --> 01:00:29.144
We were advised by--

01:00:29.228 --> 01:00:31.687
uh, the administration but also
from the federal government--

01:00:31.770 --> 01:00:34.144
that we should not
pay that ransom.

01:00:34.228 --> 01:00:37.770
We couldn't communicate with the people
that we normally communicate with.

01:00:37.853 --> 01:00:40.228
People couldn't come in
and fill out for their permits.

01:00:40.311 --> 01:00:41.937
Real estate deals
could not be done.

01:00:42.019 --> 01:00:43.144
Bills could not be paid.

01:00:43.228 --> 01:00:44.478
Parking tickets could
not be paid.

01:00:44.561 --> 01:00:45.978
Fines could not be paid.

01:00:46.061 --> 01:00:48.978
We're talking about lots
and lots of business in the city

01:00:49.061 --> 01:00:50.395
that could not be done

01:00:50.478 --> 01:00:52.478
because the systems
were crippled

01:00:52.561 --> 01:00:54.561
and pushed down to a halt.

01:00:54.645 --> 01:00:59.061
I lost, you know,
literally 12 years of files.

01:00:59.144 --> 01:01:01.812
What was the cost to Baltimore,
ultimately?

01:01:01.895 --> 01:01:04.019
Yeah, it was upwards
of $15 million,

01:01:04.103 --> 01:01:08.436
is what we had to, to pay out and
to rebuild, and build better systems.

01:01:08.520 --> 01:01:11.478
And the original ransom
was far less than that.

01:01:11.561 --> 01:01:12.978
Far less than that,
but, you know,

01:01:13.061 --> 01:01:16.144
the mayor made a decision
based on the advice of,

01:01:16.228 --> 01:01:19.561
uh, public safety experts
to not pay it.

01:01:22.561 --> 01:01:26.853
Cites across america
have been paralyzed.

01:01:26.937 --> 01:01:29.853
And some of them, including
one small town in Florida,

01:01:29.937 --> 01:01:32.103
decided it was cheaper
to pay the ransom

01:01:32.186 --> 01:01:34.770
than to try to go rebuild
the databases.

01:01:36.937 --> 01:01:38.687
Cities and governments
around the country,

01:01:38.770 --> 01:01:41.436
businesses around the country,
non-profits around the country,

01:01:41.520 --> 01:01:43.186
school systems
around the country,

01:01:43.269 --> 01:01:46.186
have to understand that this
is the world that we live in now.

01:01:46.269 --> 01:01:48.478
Right? This is the new normal.

01:01:58.436 --> 01:02:01.937
Secretary Nielsen,
looking ahead to 2018,

01:02:02.019 --> 01:02:06.103
what is DHS's current estimation

01:02:06.186 --> 01:02:08.436
of the threat to our elections,

01:02:08.520 --> 01:02:12.228
from Russia, or any other
hostile actor?

01:02:12.311 --> 01:02:13.978
We think the threat
remains high.

01:02:14.061 --> 01:02:15.478
Uh, we think vigilance
is important,

01:02:15.561 --> 01:02:18.186
and we think there's a lot
that we all need to do,

01:02:18.269 --> 01:02:19.770
uh, at all levels of government,

01:02:19.853 --> 01:02:22.311
uh, before we have
the midterm elections.

01:02:25.395 --> 01:02:27.269
When it comes to elections,

01:02:27.353 --> 01:02:29.561
the president never,
uh, understandably,

01:02:29.645 --> 01:02:32.478
never wanted the results
of the elec--

01:02:32.561 --> 01:02:34.937
of the election
to be questioned.

01:02:35.645 --> 01:02:37.395
It was very difficult,

01:02:37.478 --> 01:02:41.353
but those who need to be
focused on the elections,

01:02:41.436 --> 01:02:43.561
they know what they need to do.

01:02:43.645 --> 01:02:46.353
The people who need to do
the work that needs to be done,

01:02:46.436 --> 01:02:50.311
have really dug in and,
and recognized the, the threat.

01:02:55.561 --> 01:02:57.687
When he was running
for president,

01:02:57.770 --> 01:03:01.353
trump had not really
thought about cyber.

01:03:01.436 --> 01:03:03.853
I don't think he had even
heard about stuxnet.

01:03:03.937 --> 01:03:07.186
He certainly never registered
what it was all about.

01:03:08.186 --> 01:03:11.311
He said to me at one point,
"Oh. The cyber.

01:03:11.395 --> 01:03:13.687
The cyber is very powerful."

01:03:15.937 --> 01:03:19.228
But candidate trump said he
wanted to pull American troops

01:03:19.311 --> 01:03:23.228
out of the middle east, out
of South Korea, out of Japan.

01:03:23.311 --> 01:03:26.770
So he saw cyber as
this magic bullet.

01:03:26.853 --> 01:03:30.853
Today I'm convening this meeting
to follow through

01:03:30.937 --> 01:03:35.478
on my promise to secure
crucial infrastructure.

01:03:35.561 --> 01:03:38.353
And the networks that
we've been talking so much about

01:03:38.436 --> 01:03:41.645
over the last period of time
of the federal government

01:03:41.728 --> 01:03:44.895
against cyber threats.

01:03:51.895 --> 01:03:54.603
By the time trump
became president,

01:03:54.687 --> 01:03:59.520
the United States had built up this
massive, offensive cyber program.

01:04:03.353 --> 01:04:05.812
It had gone after
North Korea's missiles.

01:04:05.895 --> 01:04:07.812
North Korea has once again
attempted to launch

01:04:07.895 --> 01:04:09.395
a ballistic missile, and failed.

01:04:09.478 --> 01:04:12.103
They Mark the second
and third launch failures.

01:04:12.186 --> 01:04:14.561
Another failure.

01:04:14.645 --> 01:04:18.853
Using code to send those
missiles spinning into the sea.

01:04:22.770 --> 01:04:27.061
It had gone after the Isis
recruitment system.

01:04:27.144 --> 01:04:30.687
It was called
"operation glowing symphony."

01:04:30.770 --> 01:04:34.603
And the idea basically
was to knock Isis offline.

01:04:37.061 --> 01:04:40.645
But one of the key lessons
of the Obama administration

01:04:40.728 --> 01:04:44.687
was that despite developing
all these new capabilities,

01:04:44.770 --> 01:04:49.228
it took far too long to get
cyber operations approved.

01:04:50.853 --> 01:04:53.311
During the time I was in
the department of defense,

01:04:53.395 --> 01:04:55.353
not even the
secretary of defense

01:04:55.436 --> 01:04:57.228
could approve an offensive
cyber operation.

01:04:57.311 --> 01:04:59.061
That was only the president of
the United States.

01:04:59.144 --> 01:05:01.687
President Trump has taken
a very different approach,

01:05:01.770 --> 01:05:05.061
where he's delegated
the approval authority

01:05:05.144 --> 01:05:07.186
to a lot of offensive
cyber operations,

01:05:07.269 --> 01:05:08.937
not only to
the secretary of defense,

01:05:09.019 --> 01:05:11.937
but to the commander
of cyber command.

01:05:12.019 --> 01:05:14.311
What do you think our
adversaries think right now?

01:05:14.395 --> 01:05:17.812
If you do a cyber attack on
America, what's gonna happen to 'em?

01:05:17.895 --> 01:05:20.812
So, basically, uh,
I would say right now, um,

01:05:20.895 --> 01:05:23.311
they do not, um, think that
much will happen to them.

01:05:23.395 --> 01:05:26.144
-They don't fear us.
-They don't fear us.

01:05:27.978 --> 01:05:30.770
Once general nakasone
took over at the NSA

01:05:30.853 --> 01:05:32.061
and cyber command,

01:05:32.144 --> 01:05:34.103
he put together
within the organization

01:05:34.186 --> 01:05:36.228
something called the
Russia small group,

01:05:36.311 --> 01:05:41.395
who were determined to take an
aggressive stance against the Russians.

01:05:43.353 --> 01:05:46.978
For several years,
the United States had warned

01:05:47.061 --> 01:05:51.061
that Russian hackers were
inside the US electric grid.

01:05:51.812 --> 01:05:53.436
In 2018,

01:05:53.520 --> 01:05:56.603
the NSA took American-made code

01:05:56.687 --> 01:06:01.103
and put it inside the Russian
electric grid.

01:06:01.186 --> 01:06:03.228
And they designed some of it

01:06:03.311 --> 01:06:06.061
in a way to make sure
the Russians saw them.

01:06:07.019 --> 01:06:08.770
It was supposed to say,

01:06:08.853 --> 01:06:11.103
"we're not gonna do this
in a covert way.

01:06:11.186 --> 01:06:13.269
"We're gonna make you understand

01:06:13.353 --> 01:06:14.687
what the price will be."

01:06:18.937 --> 01:06:21.186
There were also
a series of messages

01:06:21.269 --> 01:06:23.645
sent to Russian
influence operatives

01:06:23.728 --> 01:06:25.812
that said, "we know who you are.

01:06:25.895 --> 01:06:28.478
"If you continue to conduct
cyber attacks,

01:06:28.561 --> 01:06:32.228
"and if you try to target
the election in 2018,

01:06:32.311 --> 01:06:33.728
there will be repercussions."

01:06:33.812 --> 01:06:35.978
There were very targeted
cyber operations

01:06:36.061 --> 01:06:37.895
to make it clear that
we knew who was doing what,

01:06:37.978 --> 01:06:41.269
and we were gonna degrade
their capability to succeed.

01:06:44.478 --> 01:06:47.687
In 2018, in the lead-up
to election day,

01:06:47.770 --> 01:06:52.186
cyber command takes down the
Russian Internet research agency.

01:06:52.269 --> 01:06:55.770
They got in there, and really
took apart their home network.

01:06:55.853 --> 01:06:57.144
Really disabled it,

01:06:57.228 --> 01:06:58.937
so that they wouldn't be able

01:06:59.019 --> 01:07:01.061
to conduct their
social media campaign.

01:07:03.603 --> 01:07:06.436
This was a very
forward-leaning operation.

01:07:06.520 --> 01:07:09.269
It looked to be
pretty successful.

01:07:09.353 --> 01:07:12.978
Russian actors were somewhat
quiet during that period.

01:07:14.186 --> 01:07:15.895
The question is,
how long will that last?

01:07:15.978 --> 01:07:20.269
Can we defend forward against
every, you know, potential actor?

01:07:24.019 --> 01:07:25.520
Good morning,
Sandra and ed.

01:07:25.603 --> 01:07:27.853
And now it is up to
the Iowa voters.

01:07:27.937 --> 01:07:30.895
Iowans in more than
1,600 precincts are gathering

01:07:30.978 --> 01:07:34.561
to back the person they want to win
the Democratic presidential nomination.

01:07:34.645 --> 01:07:36.311
My purpose here is very simple.

01:07:36.395 --> 01:07:38.687
It's to come before you
one more time

01:07:38.770 --> 01:07:41.520
and ask you to caucus for me.

01:07:41.603 --> 01:07:44.228
we are still awaiting
the first official results

01:07:44.311 --> 01:07:45.561
given to US by the party.

01:07:45.645 --> 01:07:48.311
Obviously, things are going
a bit slow for them.

01:07:48.395 --> 01:07:51.937
Sixteen hours since
the Iowa caucuses began.

01:07:52.019 --> 01:07:53.728
We're still waiting for
the results.

01:07:53.812 --> 01:07:57.061
The app didn't work.
No one knew if it would.

01:07:57.144 --> 01:07:59.478
This is, so far, not so good.

01:08:01.937 --> 01:08:03.728
Iowa was exactly my worst fear.

01:08:03.812 --> 01:08:08.353
The biggest concern was that voters
would not be able to trust the system.

01:08:08.436 --> 01:08:10.061
What about the confidence
in the vote?

01:08:10.144 --> 01:08:11.895
Especially with,
against the backdrop

01:08:11.978 --> 01:08:13.687
of the Russian
interference in 2016.

01:08:13.770 --> 01:08:17.144
What Iowa is demonstrating to
adversaries of the United States is

01:08:17.228 --> 01:08:19.269
all they have to do
is create that appearance.

01:08:19.353 --> 01:08:22.103
And they probably don't even have
to create their own disinformation.

01:08:22.186 --> 01:08:23.937
American partisans
will do it for them.

01:08:24.019 --> 01:08:25.895
The president’s son
was saying it’s rigged.

01:08:25.978 --> 01:08:27.228
The president's
campaign manager.

01:08:27.311 --> 01:08:28.603
The Biden campaign
is out there

01:08:28.687 --> 01:08:30.436
openly saying they don't trust

01:08:30.520 --> 01:08:31.770
what the results will be.

01:08:31.853 --> 01:08:35.061
They've created what's called
a perception hack.

01:08:35.144 --> 01:08:38.061
Our mind immediately
goes to the question,

01:08:38.144 --> 01:08:40.478
"Are the Russians
messing with our election?"

01:08:40.561 --> 01:08:42.853
It doesn't matter whether
they are or they aren't.

01:08:42.937 --> 01:08:45.937
This is one of the confusing
aspects of election security.

01:08:46.019 --> 01:08:48.937
It's not just about
trying to hack into computers.

01:08:49.019 --> 01:08:51.395
There's another aspect
of election interference

01:08:51.478 --> 01:08:53.311
that's about trying to
hack into your brain.

01:08:53.395 --> 01:08:55.561
They're ultimately trying
to get the American people

01:08:55.645 --> 01:08:58.269
to lose confidence
in the system.

01:08:58.353 --> 01:09:00.228
That the system
is beyond repair.

01:09:00.311 --> 01:09:03.478
That the system is broken,
and their vote doesn't matter.

01:09:03.561 --> 01:09:06.978
US officials have now told, uh,
Senator Bernie Sanders that Russia

01:09:07.061 --> 01:09:10.770
is trying to help his
presidential campaign.

01:09:10.853 --> 01:09:12.061
How do you think
it came out now,

01:09:12.144 --> 01:09:13.478
if you had the briefing
a month ago?

01:09:13.561 --> 01:09:15.978
Well, I'll let you guess
about one day before the, uh,

01:09:16.061 --> 01:09:18.311
Nevada caucus. Why do you think
it came out?

01:09:18.395 --> 01:09:21.144
'Cause the "Washington Post"?
Good friends.

01:09:21.228 --> 01:09:23.853
Joe, what do you say
to the Russians?

01:09:24.395 --> 01:09:25.978
I'm comin'.

01:09:26.061 --> 01:09:27.311
They're continuing to meddle.

01:09:27.395 --> 01:09:29.978
They're involved in this race,
and in my primary.

01:09:30.061 --> 01:09:32.561
They're involved
going after me on Facebook.

01:09:32.645 --> 01:09:34.269
They've already been taken down.

01:09:34.353 --> 01:09:36.311
Because Putin knows me
and I know him,

01:09:36.395 --> 01:09:38.228
and he doesn't want me
to be president.

01:09:38.311 --> 01:09:41.895
The Russians want everyone in
this country to mistrust everything.

01:09:41.978 --> 01:09:43.436
Whether or not
the Russians are involved,

01:09:43.520 --> 01:09:45.186
these next few months
are gonna be tense.

01:09:47.895 --> 01:09:49.395
We do have breaking news.

01:09:49.478 --> 01:09:52.728
The coronavirus outbreak
is now a global pandemic.

01:09:52.812 --> 01:09:54.478
No country is untouched.

01:09:54.561 --> 01:09:57.645
No part of our everyday lives
is untouched.

01:09:57.728 --> 01:09:59.770
We will see more cases,

01:09:59.853 --> 01:10:01.770
and things will get worse.

01:10:03.645 --> 01:10:05.353
The coronavirus

01:10:05.436 --> 01:10:09.520
has reordered the competition
for world power.

01:10:09.603 --> 01:10:11.520
And so, it's not surprising

01:10:11.603 --> 01:10:13.978
that it's reordered
cyber power, as well.

01:10:14.061 --> 01:10:16.395
Bad information is now
spreading online

01:10:16.478 --> 01:10:18.853
faster than
the coronavirus itself.

01:10:18.937 --> 01:10:20.853
Cyber experts and
public health officials

01:10:20.937 --> 01:10:24.103
warm this so-called
info-demic is dangerous,

01:10:24.186 --> 01:10:26.103
and needs to be contained.

01:10:27.853 --> 01:10:30.311
In the midst of covid-19,

01:10:30.395 --> 01:10:33.561
disinformation gets
super caffeinated.

01:10:33.645 --> 01:10:35.186
And we see it play out

01:10:35.269 --> 01:10:38.353
in Russia's favorite
petri dish once again,

01:10:38.436 --> 01:10:40.478
In Ukraine.

01:10:48.311 --> 01:10:51.061
As the coronavirus began
spreading across the world,

01:10:51.144 --> 01:10:53.728
Ukraine quickly moved
to start bringing

01:10:53.812 --> 01:10:56.353
some of its citizens back
from Wuhan,

01:10:56.436 --> 01:10:59.895
to serve out 14 days
of self-isolation

01:10:59.978 --> 01:11:03.353
in this tiny little town
in central Ukraine.

01:11:03.436 --> 01:11:06.645
These people were not
infected with the virus.

01:11:06.728 --> 01:11:11.436
But people on social media
began spreading this misinformation

01:11:11.520 --> 01:11:15.561
that these Ukrainians that are
coming home from Wuhan are infected.

01:11:16.895 --> 01:11:19.687
People started using viber,

01:11:19.770 --> 01:11:23.645
and Instagram and Facebook
to warn each other.

01:11:23.728 --> 01:11:26.812
Some of the messages
went even further in saying

01:11:26.895 --> 01:11:29.520
we need to go out
into the streets and protest.

01:11:29.603 --> 01:11:33.019
We need to turn these buses of
people around to protect our children.

01:11:33.103 --> 01:11:36.937
Or else we're going to wake up in
the morning, and we'll all be dead.

01:11:37.019 --> 01:11:40.603
-This disinformation
actually fueled

01:11:40.687 --> 01:11:43.103
a real-life protest
in the streets.

01:11:53.478 --> 01:11:55.311
Police came out in response.

01:11:55.395 --> 01:11:57.061
Clashes ensued.

01:12:00.228 --> 01:12:03.311
When something like this
happens, in Ukraine especially,

01:12:03.395 --> 01:12:07.478
the entity that is always
pointed at first is Russia.

01:12:07.561 --> 01:12:12.061
There are signs that Russia
could be involved.

01:12:12.144 --> 01:12:14.478
But there are real people
in these groups.

01:12:14.561 --> 01:12:16.186
Real people who I interviewed,

01:12:16.269 --> 01:12:19.311
who said, "I also shared
messages in this group

01:12:19.395 --> 01:12:20.645
"to go out and protest,

01:12:20.728 --> 01:12:22.478
to protect myself,
to protect my family."

01:12:22.561 --> 01:12:25.061
And it just spiraled out of
control very, very, very quickly.

01:12:25.144 --> 01:12:26.186
Within hours.

01:12:28.395 --> 01:12:31.311
There's a lesson in
what happened in Ukraine.

01:12:31.395 --> 01:12:34.853
The Russians are already
changing the playbook.

01:12:34.937 --> 01:12:36.561
They're targeting people

01:12:36.645 --> 01:12:39.395
who might be susceptible
to the message,

01:12:39.478 --> 01:12:41.228
the conspiracy.

01:12:41.311 --> 01:12:43.269
And repeat it themselves.

01:12:44.269 --> 01:12:46.311
And it's not just the Russians.

01:12:46.395 --> 01:12:49.436
The pandemic now becoming
even more than a public health crisis.

01:12:49.520 --> 01:12:51.812
It is turning into a major
diplomatic clash

01:12:51.895 --> 01:12:55.395
as the blame game unfolds
on the origins of the virus.

01:12:55.478 --> 01:12:57.853
I would like to begin

01:12:57.937 --> 01:12:59.853
by announcing some
important developments

01:12:59.937 --> 01:13:03.144
in our war against
the Chinese virus.

01:13:09.728 --> 01:13:11.937
The Chinese in 2020

01:13:12.019 --> 01:13:14.395
have used disinformation
brilliantly

01:13:14.478 --> 01:13:18.895
as people have been
casting blame for COVID-19.

01:13:18.978 --> 01:13:20.728
There was a story spread

01:13:20.812 --> 01:13:24.103
that the virus didn't begin
in a wet market in Wuhan.

01:13:24.186 --> 01:13:29.728
But instead that it began with
a US army exercise in China.

01:13:29.812 --> 01:13:33.144
There's absolutely
no evidence for this at all.

01:13:33.228 --> 01:13:35.019
But the Chinese saw

01:13:35.103 --> 01:13:39.311
how well the Russians were
able to plant this information,

01:13:39.395 --> 01:13:42.186
And watch it take off naturally

01:13:42.269 --> 01:13:45.937
among conspiracy theorists
and others.

01:13:52.144 --> 01:13:54.770
I think we’ve been
highly distracted as a country

01:13:54.853 --> 01:13:58.061
by focusing just on Russia
since 2016.

01:13:58.144 --> 01:14:01.353
When the real long-term
strategic challenge for us

01:14:01.436 --> 01:14:03.561
is going to be China globally.

01:14:03.645 --> 01:14:06.478
Russian foreign policy
is to take others down,

01:14:06.561 --> 01:14:09.019
and cause disruption
in the system.

01:14:09.853 --> 01:14:11.436
China has very
different priorities.

01:14:11.520 --> 01:14:13.812
They're trying to work within the
system and take over the system,

01:14:13.895 --> 01:14:16.478
so they're not interested
in chaos. It's all about theft.

01:14:16.561 --> 01:14:18.812
And primarily theft of
intellectual property

01:14:18.895 --> 01:14:21.520
that can be used to further
build up the Chinese economy.

01:14:25.144 --> 01:14:27.603
There was one time we were
brought into a company

01:14:27.687 --> 01:14:30.353
that was in the satellite
communications business.

01:14:31.269 --> 01:14:32.603
They had discovered a hack,

01:14:32.687 --> 01:14:34.645
and, uh, they asked us
to analyze it,

01:14:34.728 --> 01:14:37.311
and ultimately help
protect them.

01:14:38.019 --> 01:14:40.228
We saw that the email address

01:14:40.311 --> 01:14:42.978
that was being used to register
a bunch of this infrastructure

01:14:43.061 --> 01:14:45.144
was being reused continuously.

01:14:45.228 --> 01:14:47.687
It was a gmail address.

01:14:47.770 --> 01:14:49.978
And we tracked it to
an individual in China.

01:14:50.061 --> 01:14:52.311
They had a social persona,

01:14:52.395 --> 01:14:54.144
and had a Picasa album,

01:14:54.228 --> 01:14:58.144
which at the time was a photo
album that was owned by Google.

01:14:58.228 --> 01:15:01.144
It was open, and he had a
bunch of pictures of his girlfriend,

01:15:01.228 --> 01:15:03.687
and his family, and himself.

01:15:10.520 --> 01:15:13.061
And he had pictures
of his dorm room.

01:15:16.061 --> 01:15:19.353
And in the corner
of the dorm room we saw a hat.

01:15:22.478 --> 01:15:24.228
We started doing
imagery analysis,

01:15:24.311 --> 01:15:27.269
and we noticed that
the hat was pla officer's hat.

01:15:28.770 --> 01:15:30.561
We thought,
"this might be interesting."

01:15:30.645 --> 01:15:32.728
We might have someone
from the Chinese military

01:15:32.812 --> 01:15:35.645
on our hands here that may
be responsible for these attacks.

01:15:38.812 --> 01:15:41.269
We found other pictures
that he had posted online

01:15:41.353 --> 01:15:43.853
that were labeled "office."

01:15:43.937 --> 01:15:47.478
There was a picture of this
big white building behind him

01:15:47.561 --> 01:15:50.520
that had huge antennae dishes,

01:15:50.603 --> 01:15:52.561
had reflective coating
on the windows,

01:15:52.645 --> 01:15:55.103
that would prevent
signal interception.

01:15:55.186 --> 01:15:57.645
We started doing satellite
imagery analysis

01:15:57.728 --> 01:15:59.520
to try to locate this building.

01:15:59.603 --> 01:16:02.103
We tracked it down to Shanghai.

01:16:02.186 --> 01:16:03.853
To a particular area
of Shanghai.

01:16:03.937 --> 01:16:06.269
We started looking at the
imagery. We said, "wait a second.

01:16:06.353 --> 01:16:09.186
There's military guard gates
all over this building."

01:16:09.269 --> 01:16:11.436
We got the address
of that building,

01:16:11.520 --> 01:16:16.061
and we started looking into
Chinese government materials.

01:16:16.144 --> 01:16:18.603
And sure enough, we discovered
there was the headquarters

01:16:18.687 --> 01:16:21.061
of the 12th bureau
of the third department

01:16:21.144 --> 01:16:24.103
of the general staff
of the people's liberation army,

01:16:24.186 --> 01:16:26.144
giving US pretty
high-level confidence

01:16:26.228 --> 01:16:29.311
that this hack had come from
the Chinese military.

01:16:33.853 --> 01:16:36.436
This is actually
part of a plan.

01:16:37.478 --> 01:16:40.395
They lay it out in their,
their five-year plans

01:16:40.478 --> 01:16:42.561
for the technology
they want to acquire.

01:16:42.645 --> 01:16:45.603
If they can generate it
indigenously, great.

01:16:45.687 --> 01:16:46.895
If they can't,

01:16:46.978 --> 01:16:49.687
because they want to
get it fast, they'll steal it.

01:16:52.478 --> 01:16:54.853
China alone is
responsible for hacks

01:16:54.937 --> 01:16:58.603
to almost 700 public
and private targets in the US

01:16:58.687 --> 01:17:00.395
in the last five years.

01:17:01.687 --> 01:17:03.228
One of the reasons why

01:17:03.311 --> 01:17:04.770
China's most sophisticated
airplane

01:17:04.853 --> 01:17:07.436
looks like the f-35
joint strike fighter

01:17:07.520 --> 01:17:09.770
is because they stole
some of the technology

01:17:09.853 --> 01:17:11.520
from the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter.

01:17:11.603 --> 01:17:14.228
When you look at pictures of it,
you go, "Man, that looks familiar."

01:17:15.603 --> 01:17:17.103
And that's just
the tip of the iceberg,

01:17:17.186 --> 01:17:18.645
from the Chinese side.

01:17:18.728 --> 01:17:21.186
Google says it and at least
20 other companies

01:17:21.269 --> 01:17:24.395
were victims of a targeted
cyber attack originating in China.

01:17:24.478 --> 01:17:28.353
A very sophisticated cyber attack
on the health insurer Anthem.

01:17:28.436 --> 01:17:31.436
This intrusion is once again
the work of state-sponsored

01:17:31.520 --> 01:17:34.228
espionage groups based in China.

01:17:35.311 --> 01:17:36.937
And then the Chinese escalated.

01:17:37.019 --> 01:17:41.311
They spent a year inside the
office of personnel management,

01:17:41.395 --> 01:17:44.478
the most boring
bureaucracy in America.

01:17:44.561 --> 01:17:47.019
they stole 22 million files

01:17:47.103 --> 01:17:50.978
of highly classified
security clearance applications.

01:17:51.061 --> 01:17:52.853
That is an intelligence
nightmare.

01:17:52.937 --> 01:17:56.478
The Chinese now have all
sorts of detailed information

01:17:56.561 --> 01:17:58.311
about your family members,

01:17:58.395 --> 01:18:00.019
foreign friends
that you may have,

01:18:00.103 --> 01:18:02.478
that could be used
to actually recruit assets

01:18:02.561 --> 01:18:05.103
for the Chinese government
sometime in the future.

01:18:06.728 --> 01:18:08.311
By 2020,

01:18:08.395 --> 01:18:11.687
they were back at it in a
much more sophisticated way.

01:18:11.770 --> 01:18:14.520
The FBI and federal
cyber security agents

01:18:14.603 --> 01:18:17.853
are warning that hackers linked
to the Chinese government

01:18:17.937 --> 01:18:22.770
are trying to steal research on
coronavirus vaccines and therapies.

01:18:22.853 --> 01:18:26.019
The way jet fighter designs
might have been

01:18:26.103 --> 01:18:27.395
a decade ago,

01:18:27.478 --> 01:18:31.228
coronavirus has become
the holy grail.

01:18:32.895 --> 01:18:35.269
Because the country
that wins the race

01:18:35.353 --> 01:18:38.853
for the vaccine and
the treatment of covid-19

01:18:38.937 --> 01:18:42.186
will become a new kind of power,

01:18:42.269 --> 01:18:46.228
able to spread that vaccine
around the world.

01:18:49.103 --> 01:18:51.895
Finally, and perhaps
most importantly,

01:18:51.978 --> 01:18:56.311
as China has spread its economic
tentacles through the world,

01:18:56.395 --> 01:18:59.019
It has recognized that
the networks

01:18:59.103 --> 01:19:01.520
it is selling to everybody else

01:19:01.603 --> 01:19:05.395
across fiber optic cable
and 5g networks

01:19:05.478 --> 01:19:08.770
gives them an element of control

01:19:08.853 --> 01:19:12.269
that a few years ago they could
scarcely have even imagined.

01:19:13.478 --> 01:19:15.395
you could see a future where

01:19:15.478 --> 01:19:18.103
every device that you can
imagine is on the Internet,

01:19:18.186 --> 01:19:21.144
and is connected to
the 5G cellular network.

01:19:21.228 --> 01:19:24.269
5G is like moving from
radio to television

01:19:24.353 --> 01:19:27.103
in terms of how we use
our telecommunication system,

01:19:27.186 --> 01:19:29.687
and if we're thinking about,
you know, driverless cars,

01:19:29.770 --> 01:19:32.687
or our, our refrigerator that's
connected to the Internet,

01:19:32.770 --> 01:19:34.228
and all of the possibilities

01:19:34.311 --> 01:19:36.019
that come with a totally
interconnected world,

01:19:36.103 --> 01:19:38.186
that rides on a 5G network.

01:19:38.269 --> 01:19:40.269
So who controls that network

01:19:40.353 --> 01:19:43.812
is extraordinarily important, and
I think what we're waking up to

01:19:43.895 --> 01:19:46.269
Is we're confronting China

01:19:46.353 --> 01:19:49.228
that has a national champion
in its company huawei

01:19:49.311 --> 01:19:52.687
that is a long-term
security threat.

01:19:52.770 --> 01:19:57.311
This company Huawei is the
largest provider of 5G equipment.

01:19:57.395 --> 01:20:00.520
They're the ones building
the antennas that you need.

01:20:00.603 --> 01:20:04.478
They're the ones that are building
the systems that moves the data.

01:20:05.853 --> 01:20:09.228
The United States'
position on this is that

01:20:09.311 --> 01:20:13.144
any information that is
able to transmit

01:20:13.228 --> 01:20:15.186
across Huawei technology

01:20:15.269 --> 01:20:19.770
will ultimately be accessible
by the Chinese government.

01:20:19.853 --> 01:20:21.770
And what is
the Chinese government

01:20:21.853 --> 01:20:24.019
going to do with
that information

01:20:24.103 --> 01:20:25.978
is the ultimate question.

01:20:36.478 --> 01:20:37.770
Thank you.

01:20:40.228 --> 01:20:43.103
So we begin, Oklahoma. We begin.

01:20:43.186 --> 01:20:45.019
Thank you, Oklahoma.

01:20:45.103 --> 01:20:49.311
And thank you to
Vice President Mike Pence.

01:20:49.395 --> 01:20:51.895
We begin. We begin our campaign.

01:20:54.770 --> 01:20:55.895
That's nice.

01:20:59.186 --> 01:21:00.728
Thank you.

01:21:13.520 --> 01:21:15.812
I have spent the last year

01:21:15.895 --> 01:21:19.144
gaming out the 2020 election.

01:21:19.228 --> 01:21:20.770
Trying to get ahead of it.
Really trying to think through

01:21:20.853 --> 01:21:22.937
what, what's next.
What's next, what's next.

01:21:24.895 --> 01:21:27.186
My nightmare scenario
is ransomware.

01:21:27.269 --> 01:21:31.603
That a ransomware actor would gain
access to a voter registration database,

01:21:31.687 --> 01:21:35.687
lock it up, and say,
"Hey, election official.

01:21:35.770 --> 01:21:37.561
"I've locked this up.

01:21:37.645 --> 01:21:41.645
I'm not giving it back to you
unless you give me $3 million."

01:21:43.395 --> 01:21:45.228
This is what gets me up
every morning.

01:21:45.311 --> 01:21:46.603
It's the last thing
I think about at night.

01:21:46.687 --> 01:21:47.853
I wake up in the middle
of the night

01:21:47.937 --> 01:21:49.228
and think about it.
When I'm walking the dog.

01:21:49.311 --> 01:21:51.687
Up here, oh,
it's a hellscape right now.

01:21:54.978 --> 01:21:57.520
When you have a government
led by someone

01:21:57.603 --> 01:22:00.603
who appears to be beholden

01:22:00.687 --> 01:22:02.144
to Vladimir putin,

01:22:02.228 --> 01:22:04.311
you don't have much confidence

01:22:04.395 --> 01:22:07.645
that your own government
is going to protect

01:22:07.728 --> 01:22:10.520
the integrity of our election.

01:22:10.603 --> 01:22:13.812
I'm somebody who thinks that
putin should have paid a price.

01:22:14.937 --> 01:22:16.937
I don't know if
we're gonna find out

01:22:17.019 --> 01:22:18.770
exactly what the threat is

01:22:18.853 --> 01:22:21.478
until, once again,
it's too late.

01:22:24.311 --> 01:22:26.770
In 2020, the Russians are back,

01:22:26.853 --> 01:22:29.019
but so are the Chinese.

01:22:29.812 --> 01:22:31.395
And the Iranians.

01:22:31.478 --> 01:22:33.728
And the North Koreans.

01:22:35.269 --> 01:22:37.436
All of these countries
are just experimenting

01:22:37.520 --> 01:22:40.895
with things that they learned
from watching the Russians.

01:22:40.978 --> 01:22:44.645
They realize that they
can do damage to us,

01:22:44.728 --> 01:22:48.395
by merely opening up
the chasms that already exist

01:22:48.478 --> 01:22:50.019
in American society.

01:22:58.311 --> 01:23:00.645
If it were going to be
a nation-state actor

01:23:00.728 --> 01:23:03.687
who's gonna disrupt
the elections in 2020,

01:23:03.770 --> 01:23:07.561
I think mostly likely
it would be the North Koreans

01:23:07.645 --> 01:23:09.937
or the Iranians.

01:23:10.019 --> 01:23:13.645
If we were going to look for
an Iranian attack, for example,

01:23:13.728 --> 01:23:17.103
all they would have to do
is destroy one thing

01:23:17.186 --> 01:23:19.269
in one state or one county,

01:23:19.353 --> 01:23:22.645
in conjunction with an information
operation that would say,

01:23:22.728 --> 01:23:24.978
"We are the holy warriors
of Iran,

01:23:25.061 --> 01:23:27.770
and we successfully
locked up this server."

01:23:27.853 --> 01:23:30.603
The press would cover it. There
would be all these questions,

01:23:30.687 --> 01:23:32.520
and America would be
wrapped in knots.

01:23:32.603 --> 01:23:35.186
At the same time, you know,
certain political leaders

01:23:35.269 --> 01:23:36.937
might also take
advantage of that.

01:23:41.853 --> 01:23:45.186
One final question. Our
intelligence agencies have said

01:23:45.269 --> 01:23:47.978
that your country
is among the countries

01:23:48.061 --> 01:23:50.728
that are attempting to interfere
in our election.

01:23:50.812 --> 01:23:54.186
We don't interfere in the
internal affairs of another country,

01:23:54.269 --> 01:23:57.144
but there is a cyber war
going on.

01:23:57.228 --> 01:23:59.853
The United States started
that cyber war.

01:23:59.937 --> 01:24:01.353
You remember Stuxnet.

01:24:01.436 --> 01:24:05.061
Any war that
the United States starts,

01:24:05.144 --> 01:24:07.561
it won't be able to finish.

01:24:07.585 --> 01:24:18.585
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